United States v. Anthony Lyons
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21982
| 7th Cir. | 2013Background
- On Sept. 14, 2011, Springfield police in an unmarked car stopped a blue Cadillac driven by James White; Anthony Lyons was the front-seat passenger. Officers suspected White of driving with a suspended license and White fled before stopping two blocks later and running a red light.
- Officers knew White from prior encounters in which he fled from police and firearms and drugs were recovered; Dodd and Burns were experienced Street Crimes officers.
- Officer Burns observed Lyons was nervous, shaking, and avoided eye contact; Burns announced he would frisk Lyons, after which Lyons said “I have a gun on me,” and Officer Dodd revealed a loaded gun in Lyons’s waistband.
- Lyons was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm; the district court denied his suppression motion (finding reasonable suspicion to frisk) and he was convicted after a one-day trial.
- At sentencing the PSR designated Lyons as an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); guideline range was 210–262 months and supervised release up to 5 years. The district court sentenced Lyons to 210 months and indicated a “mandatory” five-year supervised release term.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of suppression but vacated and remanded for resentencing because the district court (1) treated five years of supervised release as mandatory (it is a statutory maximum), and (2) failed to state adequate reasons for selecting the within‑guidelines 210‑month term.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the frisk of Lyons was supported by reasonable, particularized suspicion | Lyons: frisk was not particularized to him; suspicion applied only to driver White (Ybarra-style argument) | Government: Lyons’s nervousness, association with White (known for fleeing with guns), and flight provided reasonable suspicion he was armed | Court: Affirmed suppression denial; totality of circumstances gave particularized suspicion to frisk Lyons |
| Whether the district court erred by imposing five years supervised release as mandatory | Lyons: court imposed five years and treated it as mandatory (procedural error) | Government: conceded court mischaracterized supervised release term | Court: Vacated sentence; five years is statutory maximum, not mandatory—remand for correct supervised release term |
| Whether the district court’s sentencing explanation was sufficient under § 3553(c) | Lyons: court failed to state reasons for selecting 210 months and did not explain weighing of factors | Government: sentence within guidelines and defendant proposed 210 months, so less explanation needed | Court: Vacated sentence for procedural error—court failed to provide adequate, individualized reasons for the within‑guidelines sentence |
| Whether remand standard should be plain‑error because Lyons didn’t object at sentencing | Government: Lyons did not object so plain‑error review applies | Lyons: was not given opportunity to object before sentence was imposed | Court: Reviewed de novo because Lyons had no chance to object and thus did not forfeit the right; procedural errors require remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police may perform limited stop and protective frisk based on reasonable suspicion)
- Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (suspicions about premises do not automatically extend to all present individuals)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (officers may frisk vehicle occupants upon reasonable suspicion they are armed and dangerous)
- Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (officers may order passengers out of vehicle during traffic stop for officer safety)
- Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (probable cause to arrest a passenger may be supported by common enterprise with driver)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (district court must avoid significant procedural error and adequately explain sentence)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (presumption of reasonableness for within‑guidelines sentences but courts must still provide individualized justification)
- United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2005) (district court must state reasons at sentencing and defendant need not object after imposition)