United States v. Anthony Jackson, 964 F.3d 197

Kevin Harris (2006 plea) and Anthony Jackson (2004 conviction) were convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii) (pre‑Fair Sentencing Act charge of "5 grams or more" of crack). Harris stipulated to 33.6 grams; Jackson’s indictment alleged ~48 grams though jury found only the 5‑gram‑or‑more element.
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the crack thresholds (e.g., from 5 g to 28 g) but was not retroactive.
The First Step Act § 404 permits courts to reduce sentences for a “covered offense” — defined as a violation of a federal criminal statute “the statutory penalties for which were modified by” the Fair Sentencing Act, when the offense was committed before Aug 3, 2010.
Key question: does “covered offense” turn on the statute of conviction (the statutory elements charged) or on the defendant’s actual conduct (drug quantity attributed to the defendant)?
District courts denied relief: Harris’s court assumed eligibility but denied reduction reasoning statutory penalties/guidelines would be unchanged given the stipulated quantity; Jackson’s court found him ineligible. Both appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §404’s definition of “covered offense” depends on the statute of conviction or on the defendant’s actual conduct (drug quantity).	Harris/Jackson: eligibility should turn on the statute of conviction (the elements charged).	Government: eligibility should turn on actual conduct/quantity attributed to the defendant.	Court held eligibility turns on the statute of conviction (statutory‑elements approach); appellants are §404‑eligible.
Whether the District Court in Harris erred in denying relief because it concluded statutory penalties and the Guidelines range would be unaffected by resentencing given the stipulated drug quantity.	Harris: the district court misapplied Guidelines/career‑offender rules; the post‑Act statutory maximum (not the stipulated quantity) controls the offense level for resentencing analysis.	Government: argued sentencing consequences would be unchanged.	Court vacated and remanded Harris because the district court may have relied on incorrect reasoning; district court must reconsider exercise of discretion.
Whether §404 relief is mandatory once a defendant is eligible.	Appellants: seek reduction if eligible.	Government: §404 is discretionary; eligibility does not compel a reduction.	Court reaffirmed §404 is discretionary; eligibility does not entitle a defendant to relief automatically.

Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (Fair Sentencing Act not retroactive; context for sentencing disparities)
Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (modifier‑attachment/nearest‑antecedent principle)
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (presume legislature means what it says)
Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016) (statutory elements define the offense)
United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2019) (adopting statute‑of‑conviction approach to §404 eligibility)
United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2019) (same)
United States v. Smith, 954 F.3d 446 (1st Cir. 2020) (same)
United States v. Johnson, 961 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2020) (same)
United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (standards of statutory review and §404 analysis)