United States v. Anthony Elonis
730 F.3d 321
3rd Cir.2013Background
- After his separation and firing from Dorney Park, Anthony Elonis posted violent, graphic statements on Facebook threatening his estranged wife, employees, law enforcement, and a school; some posts used a rap-lyric form.
- State court issued a Protection From Abuse order for his wife; FBI monitored Elonis’s public posts and interviewed him after Dorney Park reported threats.
- Federal grand jury indicted Elonis under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) on five counts for transmitting threats in interstate commerce; he was convicted on four counts and sentenced to 44 months’ imprisonment.
- Elonis argued the jury was incorrectly instructed because he lacked subjective intent to threaten (relying on Virginia v. Black), challenged indictment sufficiency, challenged sufficiency of evidence on certain counts, and objected to an instruction treating Internet transmission as interstate commerce.
- The Third Circuit upheld the convictions, applying an objective “reasonable speaker/recipient” test for true threats, finding the indictment sufficient, rejecting insufficiency claims as to Counts 3 and 5, and affirming the interstate-commerce jury instruction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Elonis) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether true-threats doctrine requires subjective intent to threaten | Black requires subjective intent to threaten; his posts lacked that intent | Black did not abolish the objective reasonable-person standard; statute requires only that defendant knowingly transmitted the communication | Court held objective Kosma standard controls: speaker must intend to make the communication, but jury may assess whether a reasonable person would foresee it as a serious threat |
| Sufficiency of the indictment (failure to quote statements) | Indictment defective for not quoting the threatening language | Indictment adequately alleged statutory elements, victim, nature and time frame to apprise defendant | Indictment sufficient under Rule 7(c) — identified elements, victims, dates and allowed defense preparation |
| Sufficiency of evidence for Counts 3 & 5 (were posts true threats) | Some posts were conditional or descriptive of past acts and thus not threats | Context and language could be reasonably viewed as threats (future-directed or conditional threats still actionable) | Viewing evidence in prosecution’s favor, a rational jury could find Counts 3 and 5 were true threats; convictions supported |
| Jury instruction that Internet transmission equals interstate commerce | Requiring proof of interstate transmission is an element; instruction relieved government of burden | Internet is inherently interstate; using Internet suffices to show transmission in interstate commerce | Instruction affirmed based on MacEwan: Internet use is an instrumentality of interstate commerce so the instruction was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (discusses true-threats doctrine and invalidates a prima facie intent provision for cross-burning statute)
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (political hyperbole versus true threat; conditionality and audience reaction relevant)
- United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1991) (adopts objective reasonable-speaker/recipient test for true threats)
- United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) (concludes Internet use is inherently interstate commerce for statutory purposes)