United States v. Anthony Bearden
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4193
8th Cir.2015Background
- Officers investigating an identity-theft matter went to a rural address and twice approached the neighboring property (White’s) to seek assistance and later to investigate a strong odor of “green marijuana.”
- On the second visit, officers smelled an “overwhelming” marijuana odor, attempted contact at White’s door, then secured the property and began obtaining a search warrant.
- An ATV rider, Anthony Bearden, arrived from the rear; officers stopped him, found a large knife, a note about water/fertilizer, keys (including to a metal outbuilding), and Bearden admitted to having personal-use marijuana and allowed officers to search his property.
- Searches of Bearden’s and White’s properties uncovered hundreds of marijuana plants; Bearden was charged, pled guilty conditionally, and contested suppression rulings and his career-offender classification.
- The magistrate and district courts credited the officers’ testimony (gate open, lawful entry onto curtilage), suppressed only pre-Miranda statements conceded by the government, denied other suppression claims, and the district court classified Bearden as a career offender based on two Missouri commercial-burglary convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge search of White’s property | Bearden argued he had a privacy interest in White’s property or that its unlawful entry tainted his seizure | Gov argued Bearden lacked standing to challenge a third party’s property search | Bearden lacked standing to challenge search of White’s property; court also concluded entry was lawful so no Fourth Amendment violation |
| Lawfulness of officers’ entry onto White’s curtilage | Entry was trespass via closed/no-trespassing gate and thus unconstitutional | Officers said gate was open, they stayed in areas open to visitors and re-entered for legitimate law-enforcement purposes after smelling marijuana | Court credited officers’ testimony; entry into driveway/curtilage was a reasonable, limited intrusion for knock-and-talk and later investigation |
| Legality of Bearden’s detention and pre-Miranda questioning | Bearden claimed he was illegally detained and interrogated before Miranda; consent was involuntary while handcuffed | Officers relied on odor, location (arrived from rear), knife, suspicious note, and inconsistencies re: tenancy to justify Terry stop and to show voluntary consent | Detention was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion; consent to search was voluntary (despite handcuffs and lack of Miranda) except for some statements the court suppressed as conceded by government |
| Career-offender classification under USSG § 4B1.1 | Bearden argued Missouri commercial-building burglaries are not crimes of violence under Begay/Descamps | Govt relied on circuit precedent treating generic burglary (including commercial) as a crime of violence; cited Olsson, Cantrell, Stymiest | Court applied binding Eighth Circuit precedent and held Missouri second-degree burglary convictions qualify as crimes of violence; career-offender designation upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (determination of standing to assert Fourth Amendment rights)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (limiting violent-felony analogies for ACCA/type-based analyses)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (categorical approach to prior-offense predicates)
- United States v. Meza-Gonzalez, 394 F.3d 587 (government burden to prove voluntary consent)
- United States v. Robbins, 682 F.3d 1111 (permissible knock-and-talk and reentry for investigation)
- United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759 (generic burglary as a crime of violence under Guidelines)
- United States v. Cantrell, 530 F.3d 684 (Missouri second-degree burglary qualifies as crime of violence)
- United States v. Olsson, 742 F.3d 855 (applying Descamps to Missouri burglary statute and affirming crime-of-violence status)