United States v. Anthony Adams
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9909
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Anthony Adams pleaded guilty as part of a plea bargain to (1) conspiracy to commit armed robbery affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. §1951(a), and (2) possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A).
- The conspiracy involved planning to rob a purported drug stash house of at least 50 kg of cocaine, with an agreement to use firearms in furtherance of the robbery.
- A sting operation (informant working with federal agents) resulted in Adams’ arrest; he did not assert entrapment and later pleaded guilty, adopting the plea’s factual basis in open court.
- The factual basis described a co-conspirator moving a toolbox between vans; after arrest the toolbox was opened and found to contain three firearms. Adams denied personally moving the toolbox or knowing its contents.
- In the plea admissions Adams acknowledged (a) agreeing with others to rob the stash house using firearms, (b) that he knowingly possessed a firearm (as charged), and (c) that a toolbox containing firearms was placed in the van as a foreseeable consequence of the agreement.
- Adams sought to withdraw his plea after the Supreme Court decided Rosemond v. United States (2014), arguing Rosemond changed the law on co-conspirator liability and rendered him improperly held accountable for the firearms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Adams) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rosemond requires reversal/remand of Adams’ §924(c) conviction and withdrawal of his plea | Rosemond imposes a stricter requirement for co-conspirator liability — a defendant must have had time to quit after learning a confederate was armed; Adams lacked that knowledge and opportunity | Adams admitted the conspiracy contemplated use of firearms and that the firearms were a foreseeable consequence; Pinkerton accountability applies to conspiracies | Court held Rosemond does not change this case; Adams’ plea admissions and Pinkerton liability make him accountable for the firearms; plea not withdrawn |
| Whether a conspirator can be held liable for firearms placed by another co-conspirator whom he did not personally arm or know about | Adams: he did not move the toolbox nor know its contents, so he cannot be held for those specific firearms under Rosemond principles | Government: agreement to commit robbery "using firearms" makes provision of weapons foreseeable and within conspiracy scope; conspirator liable for foreseeable acts | Court held that where an agreement included use of firearms, Pinkerton makes a conspirator liable for foreseeable acts of co-conspirators, regardless of who physically supplied the weapons |
| Whether Newman (tracking Pinkerton to conspiracy) combined with Rosemond changes conspiracy accountability | Adams: Newman plus Rosemond create a new, stricter standard for conspiracy liability | Government: Rosemond adapted aiding-and-abetting rules but did not change Pinkerton conspiracy principles; Newman does not alter that outcome | Court held Newman and Rosemond do not alter Pinkerton’s application; no new rule defeats Adams’ plea admissions |
| Whether Adams’ failure to attempt withdrawal from the conspiracy affects his liability | Adams: argued lack of personal knowledge/control over toolbox/firearms | Government: Adams never withdrew, so remains liable for foreseeable acts | Court held Adams never attempted to withdraw, so remains accountable under Pinkerton |
Key Cases Cited
- Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (held aiding-and-abetting §924(c) requires intent reaching beyond an unarmed offense and considers whether defendant had opportunity to quit after learning a confederate was armed)
- United States v. Newman, 755 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2014) (discusses relationship between aiding-and-abetting rules and Pinkerton conspiracy accountability)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (co-conspirator liable for acts of others that are foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy)
- United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (context on entrapment and sting operations discussed in the opinion)