25 F.4th 792
10th Cir.2022Background
- Curtis Anthony was convicted of child sex trafficking; the district court entered an initial judgment imposing imprisonment and supervised release but deferred determination of restitution.
- Months later the district court amended the judgment to set a restitution amount; Anthony appealed the restitution order.
- While restitution litigation (including appellate remand and recalculation) remained pending, Anthony filed § 2255 motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to appeal his conviction and custodial sentence.
- The district court dismissed Anthony’s § 2255 petition as untimely, reasoning the § 2255 one-year clock began to run after the initial judgment when the 14-day appeal window expired.
- The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding restitution is part of the sentence and the judgment of conviction is not final for § 2255 purposes until direct review of the entire sentence (including restitution) is complete; the case was vacated and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether restitution is part of the sentence (and thus part of the “judgment of conviction” under § 2255) | Restitution is a component of the sentence; statutes and Supreme Court precedent treat restitution as sentencing, so it belongs in the judgment of conviction | Restitution is a sanction imposed in addition to the sentence and not part of the core sentence | Restitution is part of the criminal sentence and therefore part of the judgment of conviction for § 2255 purposes |
| When the § 2255 one-year limitations period begins in a deferred-restitution case | The limitations period does not begin until the entire sentence—including restitution—becomes final on direct review | The limitations period began after the initial judgment because the defendant did not appeal the initial judgment within the 14-day rule; deferred restitution does not postpone finality | The § 2255 clock has not started while restitution proceedings and direct review of restitution are pending; finality attaches only after direct review of the whole sentence concludes |
| Whether there are two final judgments for AEDPA start-date purposes (initial judgment and later restitution order) | The single “judgment of conviction” for § 2255 includes sentence + restitution, so AEDPA contemplates one final judgment | Relies on Manrique to argue there are two final, appealable judgments and thus AEDPA can operate from the initial judgment | For AEDPA § 2255(f)(1) only one final judgment exists; though there may be two appealable judgments for direct appeal, AEDPA’s clock runs from the single judgment of conviction when the entire sentence is final |
| Whether a defendant must appeal within 14 days of the initial judgment or may wait until amended judgment with restitution | A defendant may wait to appeal until the amended judgment with restitution is entered (so waiting does not forfeit direct-appeal rights if timely appealed after the amended judgment) | Government urged that the time to appeal the initial judgment controls and may start AEDPA timing | Court held a defendant may appeal within 14 days of either the initial judgment or the amended (restitution) judgment; waiting until restitution is set is permissible and supports delaying AEDPA finality |
Key Cases Cited
- Manrique v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266 (2017) (deferred-restitution regime produces two immediately appealable judgments for direct-appeal purposes)
- Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (AEDPA limitations period begins only after direct review of both conviction and sentence concludes)
- Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003) (defining "finality" for AEDPA context)
- Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (restitution serves punitive purposes and is part of sentencing considerations)
- Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010) (deferred restitution appeals analysis referenced in Manrique)
- Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169 (1963) (defendant may await imposition of final sentence before appealing)
- Paup v. United States, 933 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2019) (a defendant need not appeal immediately and may wait until restitution is resolved to challenge conviction and custodial sentence)
- Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2015) (held AEDPA period begins when revised restitution order becomes final)