United States v. Andrews
708 F. App'x 524
| 10th Cir. | 2018Background
- Andrews pleaded guilty in 2010 to 86 drug-related counts and was sentenced to 20 years; his plea agreement waivered appeal and collateral-attack rights.
- He filed a direct appeal (dismissed based on waiver) and an earlier § 2255 motion (denied); this court previously denied a COA and authorization for a successive § 2255 motion.
- Seven years after his plea Andrews filed a Rule 60(b)(4) motion titled “motion to void the criminal judgment,” attacking district court jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial/judicial misconduct.
- The district court construed the Rule 60(b) filing as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.
- Andrews sought a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal that dismissal; the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of the district court’s procedural ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Rule 60(b) filing was a true Rule 60(b) motion or an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion | Andrews argued his filing was a Rule 60(b)(4) motion challenging jurisdiction and the judgment’s voidness, not a new collateral attack | The government/district court argued the motion asserted constitutional and jurisdictional bases for release and thus functioned as a successive § 2255 motion, requiring authorization | The court held the motion raised claims attacking conviction/sentence substance and jurisdiction, so it was an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion |
| Whether a COA should issue to appeal dismissal for lack of jurisdiction | Andrews contended jurists could debate the procedural ruling and merits | The court maintained reasonable jurists could not debate that the motion was successive § 2255 and therefore dismissal was proper | COA denied; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether Rule 60(b) can circumvent AEDPA restrictions on successive habeas claims | Andrews implicitly relied on Rule 60(b) to escape AEDPA restrictions | Precedent limits Rule 60(b) from circumventing AEDPA; true 60(b) motions only challenge procedural rulings or integrity of habeas process | Held that Rule 60(b) cannot be used to bring substantive collateral claims and Andrews’ motion did not qualify as a true 60(b) motion |
| Whether Andrews challenged a procedural defect or integrity-of-proceeding that would make his filing a true Rule 60(b) motion | Andrews argued void jurisdiction and ineffective assistance claims; he did not allege a defect in habeas proceeding integrity or that a procedural ruling prevented merits review | The court found Andrews’ claims sought merits relief rather than attacking a procedural ruling or integrity of prior habeas proceedings | Held that Andrews did not satisfy the narrow categories for a true Rule 60(b) motion |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent AEDPA’s restrictions on successive habeas claims)
- Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2006) (defines a “true” Rule 60(b) motion in the habeas context)
- United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2006) (definition of a § 2255 motion and scope of collateral attack)
- In re Lindsey, 582 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2009) (post-judgment motions are treated as § 2255 if they assert federal basis for relief)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (COA standard when district court’s ruling is procedural requires showing both debatable constitutional claim and debatable procedural ruling)
- Hall v. Scott, 292 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2002) (liberal construction of pro se COA applications)
- Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005) (court will not act as advocate for pro se litigants)