United States v. Andrew Vela, 740 F.3d 1150

Vela pled guilty to counts in the first indictment, with the government dismissing the second indictment and treating his marijuana grow-house involvement as relevant conduct for sentencing.
The plea agreement included an appeal waiver with exceptions, including a provision allowing reductions based on retroactive changes in law or directive from higher authorities.
The district court calculated the advisory Guidelines range using post-offense guidelines, following Demaree, and imposed a sentence of 138 months total (consecutive firearm sentence).
After sentencing, Peugh v. United States announced that applying amended guidelines increasing a defendant’s sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, prompting Vela’s appeal for resentencing.
Vela argued the plea was not knowing/voluntary due to the waiver and that Peugh’s retroactive change fell within the waiver’s exception.
The government contends the waiver is valid and Peugh does not retroactively apply under the exception, so the appeal must be dismissed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the appeal waiver render the appeal involuntary after a later law change?	Vela argues waiver is involuntary due to Ex Post Facto concerns.	State asserts waiver remains valid regardless of later law changes.	Waiver remains enforceable; not involuntary.
Does Peugh’s ruling fall within the waiver exception allowing sentence reduction?	Peugh qualifies under retroactive exception.	Peugh not expressly retroactive under the waiver language.	Exception not satisfied; waiver enforced.
Was the plea knowing and voluntary given the waiver provisions?	Plea not knowing due to unawareness of Ex Post Facto issue.	Plea complied with Brady and Broce standards; valid.	Plea knowingly and voluntarily entered.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (U.S. 1970) (waiver of jury trial rights upheld; challenges to plea post-plea are constrained)
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (U.S. 1968) (coerced waivers of constitutional rights are not automatically invalidated by later developments)
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (U.S. 1970) (counseled defendants may not collateral-attack guilty pleas on confession admissibility)
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1989) (waiver of trial rights generally not undermined by strategic miscalculations in pleas)
United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006) (agency precedent guiding sentencing range calculations post-offense; used in this case)
Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (U.S. 2013) (holding that improper calculation of Guidelines ranges implicates ex post facto concerns; retroactivity debated)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (U.S. 2004) (retroactivity principles for procedural errors in sentencing; not generally retroactive)
Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2013) ( Peugh not retroactive for collateral review in this circuit)
United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2005) (plea-dispute resolution viewed through contract-law lens)