United States v. Andrew Marcussen, 15 F.4th 855

Andrew N. Marcussen, a career offender, pleaded guilty in 2014 to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and was sentenced in a downward variance to 144 months (guideline range 188–235 months).
In April 2020, while incarcerated at FCI Elkton, Marcussen moved pro se for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing COPD, obesity (BMI >30), and other conditions that increase COVID-19 risk.
After exhausting BOP remedies, the district court appointed the Federal Public Defender and considered a physician’s report plus BOP medical records showing Marcussen’s conditions were being treated and ‘‘well controlled.’'
The district court denied relief, finding (a) the pandemic alone is not an extraordinary and compelling reason, (b) Marcussen’s conditions were well controlled so they did not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons, and (c) § 3553(a) factors (career-offender status, criminal history, public safety) weighed against release.
On appeal, the government conceded Marcussen’s COPD and obesity qualify under CDC guidance, but the Eighth Circuit held the judicial determination is required and the concession/CDC guidance does not control the § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) inquiry.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed: individualized inquiry required; §1B1.13 and its commentary are relevant advisory guidance; district court did not abuse its broad discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Marcussen’s COVID-19 risk/medical conditions are "extraordinary and compelling" under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)	Marcussen: COPD and obesity place him at increased risk of severe COVID-19 and thus warrant release	District court/Gov't: pandemic alone insufficient; Marcussen’s conditions are well controlled, so not extraordinary and compelling (Gov't later conceded on appeal under CDC guidance)	Affirmed denial; individualized inquiry required; pandemic alone insufficient; CDC/Gov't concession not controlling here
Whether USSG §1B1.13 commentary limits district court discretion post‑First Step Act	Marcussen: commentary is outdated and should not constrain courts now that inmates can move directly	District court/Gov't: §1B1.13 is an applicable Policy Statement and its commentary is relevant guidance	§1B1.13 and commentary are relevant advisory guidance; not binding prohibitive limits; district court properly considered it
Whether district court abused discretion in applying § 3553(a) factors	Marcussen: court overemphasized criminal history and ignored mitigating factors (BOP program, UNICOR work, release plan)	District court/Gov't: career-offender status, serious criminal history, and public-safety concerns outweigh mitigants	No abuse of discretion; court reasonably weighed § 3553(a) factors and denied release

United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2019) (standard of review for compassionate‑release denials)
United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 2020) (pandemic alone not sufficient for compassionate release)
United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) (interpretation of compassionate‑release discretion post‑First Step Act)
United States v. Rodd, 966 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2020) (district court discretion under § 3582(c)(1)(A))
United States v. Loggins, 966 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 2020) (broad discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors)
United States v. Wilcox, 666 F.3d 1154 (8th Cir. 2012) (variability among district courts does not alone show abuse of discretion)
Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992) (distinguishing advisory guidance from prohibitive rules)
United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2002) (weight of guidelines and commentary in sentencing decisions)