United States v. Andrea Forsythe
711 F. App'x 674
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Andrea Forsythe, a Pennsylvania resident renting a house in Sturgeon, burned the rented dwelling after pawning a stolen necklace and claiming insurance proceeds.
- She was indicted and conditionally pleaded guilty to malicious destruction of property by fire under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), reserving the right to appeal whether the residence was "used in interstate commerce or in an activity affecting interstate commerce."
- The District Court denied Forsythe’s pretrial motion to dismiss the § 844(i) charge and allowed the government to prove the interstate-commerce element at trial.
- Forsythe argued on appeal that Russell v. United States no longer controls after Lopez, Morrison, and Jones, and that § 844(i) cannot reach intrastate rental residential arson.
- The Third Circuit treated the Commerce Clause challenge as jurisdictional (non-waivable) and reached the merits.
- The court affirmed, holding Russell remains controlling and § 844(i) validly covers the arson of rented residential property.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 844(i) exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power as applied to intrastate rental residential arson | § 844(i) does not reach a purely intrastate rental of residential property after Lopez, Morrison, and Jones weakened Russell | Russell controls: renting is economic activity and § 844(i) contains a jurisdictional element linking the offense to commerce | Rejected plaintiff; § 844(i) constitutional as applied — Russell remains binding |
| Whether the conditional guilty plea waived the Commerce Clause challenge | (implicit) plea preserved only statutory/textual issue, not broader constitutional attack | Commerce-Clause as-applied challenges are jurisdictional and cannot be waived | Court held challenge is jurisdictional and was not waived |
| Whether Jones or later cases abrogate Russell or alter statutory interpretation of § 844(i) | Jones and post‑Lopez cases undermine Russell and limit § 844(i) to interstate or commercial uses | Jones distinguished owner‑occupied residences and reaffirmed Russell’s treatment of rental property; subsequent cases did not overrule Russell | Court held Jones does not overrule Russell and Russell remains authoritative |
| Whether any statutory construction argument (distinct from constitutional) changes result | Construing § 844(i) via Jones yields exclusion of intrastate rentals | Russell’s construction of “used in an activity affecting commerce” controls | Statutory argument fails; § 844(i) reaches rented residential property |
Key Cases Cited
- Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985) (upheld § 844(i) coverage of rented residential property as commerce‑affecting economic activity)
- United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limits Congress’s commerce power where statute lacks economic character or jurisdictional element)
- United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidated federal civil remedy for gender‑motivated violence for insufficient commerce nexus)
- Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (held § 844(i) does not reach owner‑occupied noncommercial residences; distinguished Russell)
- United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2002) (as‑applied Commerce Clause challenges are jurisdictional and not waived by guilty plea)
- United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001) (lower courts must follow directly applicable Supreme Court precedent even if later decisions appear to weaken it)