United States v. Andre Patterson
872 F.3d 426
7th Cir.2017Background
- Patterson was indicted in 2012 for participating in a fictitious stash-house robbery; convicted in 2015 of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute ≥5 kg cocaine (Count I) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (Count XV).
- Investigative evidence included a recorded hotel-room conversation in which an undercover agent and coconspirators discussed quantities (references to 6, 10, and 20 "bricks") and a car stop that yielded a 9mm handgun with Patterson’s fingerprints.
- Pretrial, Patterson was found incompetent in 2012, committed for treatment, underwent evaluations at BOP facilities, refused voluntary medication, and litigated a Sell hearing over forcible medication; competency disputes and appeals produced multi-year delays.
- Patterson moved to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment at various stages, arguing transportation and institutional delays were not excludable; the district court denied those motions.
- At trial prosecutors characterized the investigation as "good police work;" Patterson later claimed improper vouching.
- At sentencing the court adopted a PSR finding a base offense level corresponding to 15–50 kg cocaine (level 32) without an explicit judicial finding tying a specific drug quantity to Patterson; the Seventh Circuit vacated Count I sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Patterson's Argument | United States' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Speedy Trial Act exclusions | Delays in transport to BOP and report-signing are not excludable under §3161(h)(1)(F) or otherwise, so 70-day clock ran | Periods were excluded by court orders, by incompetency exclusion §3161(h)(4), and competency proceedings exclusion §3161(h)(1)(A) | All challenged periods were properly excluded; denial of Speedy Trial Act motions affirmed |
| Sixth Amendment speedy trial | Lengthy delay and government-caused transport/report delays violated his constitutional right | Delays were largely institutional/neutral, many delays caused or invited by Patterson (competency contests, appeals); little prejudice shown | No Sixth Amendment violation; denial affirmed |
| Prosecutorial misconduct (vouching) | Opening and closing statements improperly vouched for witness credibility by praising police and investigation | Comments described investigation quality and were proper argument; Patterson could attack methods at trial | No plain error; comments were permissible characterization of investigation |
| Sentencing drug-quantity attribution | Court erred by imposing base offense level for 15–50 kg without explicit finding that Patterson reasonably foresaw that quantity | Court relied on PSR and recorded statements to support quantity | Plain error: district court failed to make explicit factual drug-quantity finding; Count I sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (speedy-trial prejudice and analysis framework)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Loud Hawk v. United States, 474 U.S. 302 (delay attributable to defendant while pursuing interlocutory appeals)
- United States v. Wagner, 996 F.2d 906 (necessity of explicit drug-quantity findings at sentencing)
- United States v. Arceo, 535 F.3d 679 (standard of review for Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claims)