United States v. Anderson
ACM 38959
| A.F.C.C.A. | Apr 20, 2017Background
- Appellant, a married USAF lieutenant colonel on TDY in Thailand, admitted bringing a Thai civilian (SN) into government billeting in violation of a commander’s no-unauthorized-guest order and engaging in repeated sexual intercourse with her.
- Appellant pleaded guilty at a general court-martial to willful disobedience of an order (Article 92) and adultery (Article 134); officer members sentenced him to a dismissal and a reprimand.
- The convening authority approved the sentence; Appellant appealed raising four issues: improvident plea to adultery, improper admission of testimony at sentencing, sentence inappropriateness, and erroneous SJA post-trial advice regarding amended Article 60.
- At the Care inquiry Appellant admitted facts showing his conduct was prejudicial to good order and service-discrediting (violated order, subordinates learned, impact on deployment and Embassy awareness).
- SN testified at sentencing (through an interpreter) about sexual encounters including that she vomited and had sex while vomiting; defense objected; the military judge admitted the testimony as facts/circumstances of the offense.
- The SJA initially advised the convening authority to consider FY14 NDAA Article 60 changes (which were inapplicable because offenses predated the effective date); later addenda acknowledged the law did not apply but maintained a recommendation to approve findings and sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether guilty plea to adultery was improvident | Plea improvident because judge used non-verbatim definitions and failed to elicit full factual basis | Military judge conducted adequate Care inquiry; appellant admitted facts supporting elements | Affirmed — no substantial basis to question plea; judge did not abuse discretion |
| 2. Whether sentencing testimony (vomiting/sex) was improperly admitted | Testimony went beyond admitted facts, not proper victim‑impact, risked implying nonconsent | Testimony was facts and circumstances of the offense admissible under R.C.M. 1001(b)(4); judge performed 403 analysis | Affirmed — admission was within judge’s discretion |
| 3. Whether dismissal was inappropriately severe | Dismissal excessive given appellant’s service and mitigation evidence | Officer violated order on deployment, conduct known to subordinates, jeopardized mission; sentence within maximum | Affirmed — dismissal not inappropriately severe; mitigation would be clemency not appellate action |
| 4. Whether SJA erred by advising convening authority to consider inapplicable Article 60 changes | SJA’s advice applied post‑NDAA rules to pre‑effective‑date offenses; prejudiced clemency process | SJA later corrected advice; convening authority properly informed and considered matters; no colorable showing of prejudice | Affirmed — no prejudicial error; any potential error cured by addenda |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Blouin, 74 M.J. 247 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (standard for reviewing acceptance of guilty pleas)
- United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (adequate factual basis required for plea)
- United States v. Moon, 73 M.J. 382 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (test for substantial basis to question a plea)
- United States v. Ediger, 68 M.J. 243 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (review standard for admission of sentencing evidence)
- United States v. Gogas, 55 M.J. 521 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (government may introduce facts and circumstances of offenses at sentencing)
- United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1982) (individualized consideration for sentence appropriateness)
- United States v. Green, 44 M.J. 93 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (errors in SJAR do not automatically require return; test for prejudice)
- United States v. Kho, 54 M.J. 63 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (standard for showing colorable prejudice from SJAR/SJA error)
