United States v. Anderson
745 F.3d 593
1st Cir.2014Background
- Anderson pled guilty to two counts of possession of firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) based on undercover purchases in 2010.
- At sentencing the government sought ACCA enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) based on Anderson's prior state convictions, and the district court found four qualifying prior violent felonies, yielding the 15‑year mandatory minimum sentence.
- The government later abandoned reliance on Anderson’s 2004 simple assault and battery conviction; the ACCA enhancement therefore turned on whether his 2006 conviction for assault and battery on a court officer (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 13D) qualified as a "violent felony" under ACCA’s residual clause.
- Massachusetts law recognizes three forms of assault and battery: harmful (likely to cause bodily harm), reckless (willful, wanton, reckless causing injury), and offensive (nonconsensual touching that offends personal integrity).
- The charging statute for assault on public employees (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 277, § 79) requires the defendant know the victim’s public‑employee status; the 2006 complaint specified Anderson assaulted a court officer engaged in duties.
- Anderson argued (1) the § 13D offense does not typically involve purposeful, violent, aggressive conduct and thus fails ACCA’s Begay test, and (2) ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected both arguments; this Court affirms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Anderson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether assault and battery on a court officer qualifies as a "violent felony" under ACCA residual clause | The offense involves purposeful, unwelcome contact with a known court officer performing duties and therefore presents a serious potential risk of physical injury and is similar in kind to enumerated offenses | The statute covers reckless and offensive forms; because it can be committed recklessly or without risking injury, it does not typically involve purposeful, violent, aggressive conduct required by Begay | Affirmed: the offense typically involves purposeful, violent, aggressive conduct and presents a serious potential risk of injury; qualifies as a violent felony |
| Whether ACCA's residual clause is void for vagueness | ACCA is valid and binding precedent (Sykes) supports constitutionality | Residual clause is unconstitutionally vague | Rejected: Court bound by Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent; ACCA not void for vagueness |
| Whether Descamps requires treating Mass. §13D as indivisible so conviction cannot be narrowed to violent forms | Gov't relied on record showing conviction as assault on a court officer (charging document) | Anderson suggests Descamps may preclude using the charging statute to narrow an indivisible, overbroad statute | Not reached on merits: argument forfeited/waived (not raised below or in opening brief); Court declines to address |
| Whether district court could rely on charging documents to identify the form of assault | Charging document specified assault on a court officer and parties did not dispute it | Anderson did not dispute accuracy of description at sentencing | Court accepted description and relied on it; no error raised on this point |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (restricts use of divisible/indivisible statute analysis when comparing state offense to federal definition)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (interpreting ACCA residual clause risk prong; "serious potential risk" inquiry)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (offenses must be "similar in kind" to enumerated crimes — purposeful, violent, aggressive)
- Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) (upholding constitutionality of ACCA residual clause statement that it "states an intelligible principle")
- United States v. Dancy, 640 F.3d 455 (1st Cir. 2011) (assault and battery on police officer qualifies under ACCA residual clause)
- United States v. Jonas, 689 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2012) (assault and battery on corrections officer is a crime of violence under the guidelines; applied similar reasoning)