United States v. Amy Gonzalez
905 F.3d 165
| 3rd Cir. | 2018Background
- Siblings David Matusiewicz and Amy Gonzalez (and their mother Lenore, co-defendant) orchestrated a multi-year campaign of online and offline harassment alleging Christine Belford sexually abused her children; Belford was later murdered in the New Castle County Courthouse by Thomas Matusiewicz (an unindicted co-conspirator and David’s father).
- Activities included anonymous letters, a defamatory website and YouTube videos, solicited surveillance, false polygraph materials, and repeated custody petitions; David previously kidnapped the children and pleaded guilty to federal kidnapping charges.
- Defendants were indicted on conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), interstate stalking (18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1)), interstate stalking resulting in death, and cyberstalking resulting in death (18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)); jury convicted after five-week trial.
- District Court sentenced David and Gonzalez to five years on the conspiracy count and life imprisonment on the cyberstalking/death-count; multiple sentencing enhancements applied (first-degree murder cross-reference, vulnerable-victim, official-victim).
- On appeal defendants raised challenges including sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions (unanimity and "death results" causation), First Amendment and vagueness challenges to § 2261A, venue/recusal issues, evidentiary rulings (family court order, therapy recordings/emails, polygraph exclusion), Confrontation Clause, and Guideline enhancements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy and §2261A convictions | Govt: evidence of coordinated campaign, false accusations, surveillance, weapons and travel showed agreement, intent, and that death resulted | Defendants: Thomas acted alone; no express agreement to stalk/kill; beliefs in allegations negated criminal intent | Affirmed: ample circumstantial evidence supported conspiracy, stalking, and that death "resulted" (actual/proximate or Pinkerton/co-conspirator liability) |
| Specific unanimity instruction for course-of-conduct and mens rea | Govt: statute’s alternatives are means, general unanimity sufficient | Defendants: jury must unanimously agree which acts and which mental state satisfied §2261A | Held: no specific unanimity required; mens rea alternatives and individual acts forming a course are alternative means, not separate elements (Beros exception not triggered) |
| "Death results" jury instruction (causation standard for life exposure) | Defendants: instruction should require agreement to an agreement to cause death; instruction may be inadequate | Govt: instruction may include (1) actual and proximate causation or (2) co-conspirator (Pinkerton) liability | Held: District Court’s instruction (but-for actual cause and a proximate/foreseeable standard, plus Pinkerton theory) was proper and not plain error; court even required a protective proximate-cause showing |
| First Amendment overbreadth/as-applied challenge to §2261A(2) | Gonzalez: her communications were protected opinion/true belief | Govt: statute targets conduct; defendants’ speech was defamatory or integral to criminal conduct | Held: §2261A(2) constitutional as applied; defendants’ false defamatory statements and speech integral to harassment are unprotected |
| Admission of Delaware Family Court TPR order | Defendants: unfairly prejudicial, impermissible character/404(b) evidence; juror deference to judicial findings | Govt: TPR relevant to motive, state of mind; witnesses from TPR testified | Held: admission for limited purpose with redactions and limiting instructions was not abuse of discretion under Rules 403/404(b) |
| Admission of therapy recordings and emails; Confrontation Clause | Defendants: hearsay and testimonial (Sixth Amendment) | Govt: admissible under hearsay exceptions (803(3) state of mind and 803(4) medical diagnosis/treatment); not testimonial | Held: therapy statements admissible under 803(4) (and 803(3)); emails admissible under 803(3); not testimonial, no Confrontation violation |
| Exclusion of polygraph rebuttal evidence | Defendants: violated right to present a defense; no per se bar | Govt/District Ct: reliability concerns and procedural disclosure issues justify exclusion | Held: exclusion upheld; per Scheffer, courts may exclude polygraph; district court acted within discretion |
| Sentencing findings and enhancements (Apprendi/Guidelines, Official Victim, Vulnerable Victim, Eighth Amendment) | Defendants: factual findings at sentencing must be beyond reasonable doubt; enhancements not warranted; life sentence cruel and unusual | Govt: enhancements supported by record; findings adjust Guidelines only (not statutory maximum) | Held: Apprendi inapplicable to Guidelines factfinding (Grier control); Official-victim and vulnerable-victim enhancements properly applied; life term within statutory authority and not Eighth Amendment violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing statutory maximum must be found by jury beyond reasonable doubt)
- Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) ("death results" enhancement requires actual cause — but-for causation — and is an element for jury)
- Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (discussion of proximate cause and foreseeability in causation analysis)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (conspirator liability for co-conspirators’ acts in furtherance of the conspiracy)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause treats testimonial out-of-court statements as subject to cross-examination)
- United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (permissibility of categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence)
- Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (alternative mental states may be alternative means, not separate elements)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (no constitutional value in false statements of fact; defamation not protected)
- United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2007) (Apprendi does not apply to facts used solely to determine advisory Guidelines ranges)