United States v. Alvin Clay, 720 F.3d 1021

Clay was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and four counts of money laundering in a scheme involving inflated property appraisals and kickback-like payments through Clay Construction.
Clay contends the district court applied an incorrect standard to assess prejudice from the Government’s alleged use of perjured testimony by McCuien at trial.
The Government and district court acknowledged McCuien lied, but the court held there was no reasonable likelihood the perjured testimony affected the verdict.
Clay introduced new-evidence about McCuien’s experience and past real estate activity at a motion for new trial, which the district court and appellate court found cumulative and unpersuasive.
The Government later acknowledged, in a post-plea discussion regarding Nealy, that McCuien had lied, underscoring concerns about falsity of trial testimony.
On habeas review, the court treated the claim as trial error under Brecht and applied Agurs-based materiality to assess prejudice, concluding no substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.
The court emphasized that McCuien was thoroughly impeached at trial and that substantial circumstantial evidence showed Clay’s knowing participation in the scheme.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper prejudice standard for perjured testimony	Clay argues Agurs applies a looser standard than sufficiency.	Clay contends the district court misapplied materiality and prejudice standards.	Agurs standard applied; no substantial prejudice shown.
Harmless-error vs. structural-error analysis	Perjured testimony is trial error subject to Brecht harmless error review.	No structural error; harms should be assessed under harmless-error framework.	False testimony is trial error; Brecht applies for prejudice inquiry.
Whether the asserted perjured testimony had a substantial and injurious effect	McCuien’s false testimony could have swayed the jury against Clay.	Strong corroborating evidence and extensive impeachment of McCuien undermined the impact.	No substantial and injurious effect; no relief granted.

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court 1976) (any reasonable likelihood standard for perjured testimony)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (Supreme Court 1993) (harmless-error review for trial errors in habeas corpus)
O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (Supreme Court 1995) (grave doubt—actual prejudice required for habeas relief)
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (Supreme Court 1946) (standard for prejudice guidelines in review)
United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court 1986) (prejudice standards and harmless error considerations)
Chang v. Minnesota, 521 F.3d 828 (8th Cir. 2008) (weighing evidence and impeachment impact in harmless-error analysis)
Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2009) (materiality of perjured testimony compared to general Brady claims)