30 F. Supp. 3d 323
E.D. Pa.2014Background
- In May 2009 police pursued two men after a suspected attempted PNC Bank robbery; a duffel bag left at the scene contained tools, zip-ties, a pistol, and gloves; one glove later contained Alvin’s DNA. Alvin was arrested May 1, 2009; Duffy was later indicted as an alleged getaway driver.
- Alvin was federally indicted Feb. 4, 2010; Duffy was added in a Jan. 6, 2011 superseding indictment. Both have remained subject to repeated continuances and two joint trials that each ended in mistrial (Nov. 2012 and Nov. 2013).
- On March 12, 2014 the Government produced four FBI lab reports (dated 2010–2011) that had not previously been disclosed; one reported Caucasian head hair on items associated with the duffel bag—potentially implicating an alternative perpetrator.
- Defendants moved to dismiss the superseding indictment on double jeopardy, Brady (delayed disclosure of exculpatory/impeachment evidence), and Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds.
- The court found the FBI reports were exculpatory, that disclosure was delayed nearly four years (and knowingly withheld for six months after the AUSA obtained them), and that the overall pretrial delay (53 months for Alvin; 44 months for Duffy) plus Government-caused delays presumptively and specifically prejudiced the defendants.
- Holding: the court denied double jeopardy relief, found a Brady violation, and (most importantly) concluded the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation warranted dismissal of the superseding indictment with prejudice as to both Alvin and Duffy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Double Jeopardy (retrial barred after gov’t-provoked mistrials) | Gov’t misconduct during prior trials was intentional and aimed to goad defendants into mistrial, so retrial should be barred | Retrial allowed only if prosecutor intended to "goad" into mistrial; defendants say repeated governmental errors show intent | Denied. Court found government errors negligent/sloppy, not intentional; no evidence of intent to force mistrial, so double jeopardy does not bar retrial |
| Brady (timely disclosure of exculpatory/impeaching evidence) | Late disclosure of FBI reports (including Caucasian hair on bag items) deprived defendants of material exculpatory and impeachment evidence | Gov’t argued disclosure five days before scheduled trial (and subsequent continuance) was timely for effective use | Held that reports were exculpatory and were impermissibly delayed; Brady violation established because delay prevented effective pretrial investigation and could have led to other evidence |
| Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial | Long pretrial delay, compounded by two gov’t-caused mistrials and knowing Brady suppression, violated constitutional speedy-trial rights; dismissal required | Gov’t relied on Speedy Trial Act timing and excusable delays; argued continuances and court congestion explain much of the delay | Held violation. Applying Barker factors, court found extraordinary delay, government principally responsible for much of it, defendants asserted rights, prejudice (presumed and specific) proven; dismissal with prejudice required |
| Remedy (retrial/new trial date) | Defendants sought dismissal with prejudice | Gov’t sought designation of a new trial date | Court denied government’s motion for new trial date and dismissed the superseding indictments as to both defendants with prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose exculpatory or impeaching evidence)
- Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) (double jeopardy bars retrial only when prosecutor intended to "goad" defendant into mistrial)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor test for Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claims)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumption of prejudice where government negligence produces lengthy delay)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality standard for suppressed evidence undermining confidence in outcome)
- United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (limits on double jeopardy after mistrial)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence and duty to disclose)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (reasonable probability standard for materiality under Brady)
- United States v. Velazquez, 749 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2014) (application of Barker factors in this circuit)