United States v. Alvaro Gonzalez-Monterroso, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2830

Gonzalez-Monterroso pled guilty to illegal reentry in the District of Arizona.
He had a Delaware state conviction for attempted rape in the fourth degree under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 531, 532, 770.
The PSR applied a 16-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because the prior conviction allegedly qualified as a crime of violence.
The district court used the Descamps framework to apply a modified categorical approach to the Delaware attempt statute and underlying offense.
Gonzalez objected, arguing Delaware’s attempt statute criminalizes more conduct than the federal generic definition of attempt.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held Delaware’s attempt statute is broader; the state offense does not match the federal generic attempt or the corresponding violence category.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Delaware’s attempt statute matches the federal generic ‘attempt'.	Gonzalez contends Delaware § 531(2) defines a broader 'substantial step'.	The government argues the Delaware statute can be analyzed via the modified categorical approach.	Delaware’s attempt statute is not a categorical match; modified categorical not available; error on enhancement.
Whether Gonzalez’s underlying Delaware offense (attempted rape in the fourth degree) qualifies as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1).	Gonzalez asserts the underlying offense does not categorically meet the federal violence definitions.	Gonzalez’s age-gap facts and conduct could render the offense a crime of violence under the guidelines.	Under controlling precedents, it does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence; remand for resentencing without the 16-level enhancement.
Whether the district court could use the modified categorical approach given Descamps and divisibility concerns.	Descamps allows a limited modified categorical analysis if the statute is divisible.	The Delaware statute is not divisible; the modified approach applies in narrow cases only.	Modified categorical approach not available here; cannot rely on admissions to prove a qualifying definition.

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (ability to use modified categorical approach only for divisible statutes)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (framework for comparing state and federal offenses for violence/attempts)
Gomez-Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2012) (definitive guide for when an attempt conviction is present and violence category applies)
Velasquez-Bosque, 601 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2010) (elements-based comparison to federal generic offenses)
Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2013) (multi-crime approach within crime-of-violence category)
Descamps v. United States, U.S. Supreme Court (2013) (divisibility required for modified categorical analysis)
Acostar-Chavez, 727 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2013) (limited use of modified categorical approach when statute is divisible)
Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2011) (definition of ‘attempt’ includes intent and substantial step)
Saavedra-Velazquez, 578 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) (relationship between attempt and violence categories)
Gomez, 732 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2013) (generic statutory rape definition incl. age/differential elements)
Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2013) (limits of applying violent-offense labels to minor-sex offenses)
Gronenthal v. State, 779 A.2d 876 (Del. 2001) (Delaware law on ‘substantial step’ focus on intent)
Hassan-El v. State, 911 A.2d 385 (Del. 2006) (Delaware’s breadth of the attempt statute)