952 F.3d 83
2d Cir.2020Background
- Maria Soly Almonte was convicted by a jury of five counts including conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of minors (18 U.S.C. §1594(c)), sex trafficking of a minor under 14 (18 U.S.C. §1591(a),(b)(1)), sex trafficking of a 14–17-year-old, use of interstate commerce to promote unlawful activity, and conspiracy to do the same. She was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.
- At trial the government presented evidence that Almonte met the under‑14 victim ("JF") in person at least twice, told JF how the prostitution business worked, arranged a commercial sexual encounter involving JF, and collected money after the encounter; Almonte testified she thought JF looked “pretty young.”
- Almonte moved for acquittal under Rule 29 as to Count Two (victim under 14), arguing insufficient evidence that she had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim under §1591(c).
- At sentencing the court considered Almonte’s false testimony at trial as a §3553(a) factor; neither the government nor the PSR sought a Guidelines obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. §3C1.1.
- Almonte appealed, arguing (1) insufficient evidence on Count Two; (2) procedural error because the court considered perjury without applying §3C1.1; and (3) substantive unreasonableness of the 20‑year sentence and unwarranted disparity with her mother’s 5‑year sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for Count Two (§1591(c) — “reasonable opportunity to observe” victim under 14) | Evidence of two in‑person meetings, Almonte’s own testimony she thought JF looked young, witnesses describing face‑to‑face interactions and arranging a commercial encounter; a rational juror could find she had a reasonable opportunity to observe | Interaction evidence was insufficient; Robinson requires more extensive personal relationship to show opportunity to observe | Affirmed conviction. Court held evidence (in‑person meetings, testimony, corroborating witnesses) was sufficient under §1591(c) and Robinson does not impose a higher minimum showing |
| Procedural reasonableness of sentence (consideration of false testimony without §3C1.1 enhancement) | Court may consider defendant’s perjury under §3553(a) and §3661 even if no Guidelines §3C1.1 enhancement was sought or in the PSR | Court should not rely on false testimony except by applying §3C1.1 enhancement and making the requisite findings | Affirmed. Court properly considered perjury as a §3553(a) factor; no requirement that the judge sua sponte apply §3C1.1 when no party requested it |
| Substantive reasonableness and disparity with codefendant | Sentence (20 yrs) was within permissible range given gravity; court accounted for mitigating factors and imposed a sentence below the Guidelines (life) but above statutory minimum | Sentence was excessive given mitigating evidence; disparity with mother’s 5‑year plea sentence was unwarranted | Affirmed. Sentence was within the broad range of reasonable outcomes; mother was not similarly situated and courts need not equalize sentences among codefendants |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Klein, 913 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2019) (standard for de novo review of sufficiency challenges under Rule 29)
- United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832 (2d Cir. 2015) (view evidence in government’s favor and defer to jury credibility findings)
- United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2012) (§1591(c) relieves government of proving knowledge of age; personal confrontation can satisfy “reasonable opportunity to observe”)
- United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (standards for appellate review of sentence reasonableness)
- United States v. Genao, 869 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2017) (examples of procedural sentencing error)
- United States v. Wernick, 691 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2012) (plain‑error review in sentencing context applied less stringently)
- United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009) (perjury reflects lack of respect for law and is relevant under §3553(a))
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (sentencing procedures: calculate Guidelines and consider §3553(a) factors)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Sentencing Guidelines are advisory)
- United States v. Perez‑Frias, 636 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2011) (Guidelines sentences typically fall within the range of reasonable outcomes)
- United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2012) (weighting aggravating and mitigating factors lies with sentencing court)
- United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2008) (no requirement to explain disparities among codefendants)
- United States v. Thompson, 808 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2015) (§3C1.1 perjury enhancement requires district court findings when contested)