United States v. Allegra, 187 F. Supp. 3d 918

Robert Allegra, a licensed pilot, was arrested March 25, 2015 at Van Nuys Airport in an FBI/DEA drug-trafficking investigation involving alleged transport of ~100 lbs of cocaine.
After arrest, Allegra was Mirandized, signed an FBI waiver form stating he was willing to answer questions without a lawyer, and was interviewed by DEA SA Patrick Brosnan and FBI SA David Ostrow; the interview was videotaped and transcribed.
During the interview Allegra asked about counsel three times; the court focuses on the third, unambiguous question: “So can you provide me with an attorney?”
Agents acknowledged Allegra’s request for an attorney but then told him he would be charged and locked up if he insisted on counsel and encouraged cooperation instead; after that exchange Allegra made incriminating admissions.
Allegra moved to suppress statements made after his request for counsel, arguing the questioning should have ceased under Miranda/Edwards; the Government argued the request was ambiguous and/or Allegra subsequently initiated further conversation and waived counsel.
The district court granted suppression, finding Allegra unambiguously invoked his right to counsel and that the agents’ follow-up conduct constituted prohibited interrogation that precluded a valid waiver.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Allegra unambiguously invoked his Miranda right to counsel when he asked “So can you provide me with an attorney?”	Allegra: the question used the decisive word “can” and should be read as a present request for counsel requiring cessation of questioning.	Government: prior equivocations and the total context rendered the request ambiguous so questioning could continue.	Court: The question was an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel and officers understood it as such.
Whether subsequent statements are admissible because Allegra initiated further discussion or knowingly waived counsel after invocation	Allegra: agents’ comments (threat of being locked up; urging cooperation) were interrogation/badgering, so any subsequent initiation was coerced and waiver invalid.	Government: Allegra later continued the conversation and made admissions, implying initiation and waiver.	Court: Agents’ responses amounted to prohibited interrogation under Edwards/Innis; subsequent statements are presumptively involuntary and suppressed.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (right to counsel; interrogation must cease on request)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (post-invocation interrogation prohibited unless counsel present or suspect initiates)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (request for counsel must be unambiguous to require cessation)
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (Edwards described as ‘‘second-layer’’ protection)
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (what constitutes suspect initiation of further discussion)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (definition of interrogation and ‘‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’')
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (post-request responses cannot be used to question clarity of initial request)
United States v. Lee, 413 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. — "Can I have a lawyer?" and officer responses relevant to coercion analysis)
United States v. Hunter, 708 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. — "can" as decisive word indicating present request for counsel)