United States v. Alfred Velazquez, 1 F.4th 1132

At the Otay Mesa Port of Entry in July 2017, customs officers found two packages containing over 2,000 grams of a fentanyl/heroin mixture concealed inside the intake manifold of the car Velazquez was driving. He was arrested and indicted for importing controlled substances.
Velazquez testified as the defendant (the “blind mule” defense) that he did not know drugs were hidden in the car; he said he bought the car recently and gave explanations for his statements to officers.
Government case was circumstantial: officer observations (nervousness, alleged lack of personalization), records about the cheap recent purchase, many border crossings, and Velazquez’s initial lie about ownership. Agent testimony on typical “blind mule” characteristics was limited.
During closing, the prosecutor described reasonable doubt as something jurors use in everyday decisions (e.g., getting up, having a meal, driving to court). Defense objected; the court admonished once to follow the jury instruction, but later overruled a second objection during rebuttal.
The jury convicted and the district court sentenced Velazquez to 151 months. On appeal the Ninth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding the prosecutor improperly trivialized the reasonable-doubt standard and the trial court failed to neutralize the prejudice. The dissent would have affirmed, emphasizing instructions, admonitions, and the weight of the evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Did prosecutor’s closing argument improperly trivialize the reasonable-doubt standard?	Velazquez: prosecutor equated "firm conviction" with routine, everyday choices (meals, driving), thereby misstating and trivializing the constitutional standard.	Government: remarks were in context, tracked court instruction, and were harmless; some admonitions and jury instructions cured any error.	Held: Yes. The court found the analogies inappropriate and misleading and concluded the prosecutor misstated the law.
2) If improper, did the district court neutralize any prejudice (harmless error)?	Velazquez: court’s single admonition and later overruling left jurors with prosecutor’s framing, and the evidence was not overwhelming, so prejudice was likely.	Government: repeated correct instructions, written instructions to take into deliberations, defense had opportunity to rebut, and the evidence was strong—so any error was neutralized or harmless.	Held: No. The majority concluded the curative measures were inadequate, the prosecutor’s points were among the closing themes jurors heard, the evidence was not overwhelming, and prejudice was more probable than not; conviction vacated and remanded.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes proof beyond a reasonable doubt as required to convict)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (reasonable-doubt standard protects liberty and presumption of innocence)
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (criticizes analogies to everyday decisions in explaining reasonable doubt)
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (prosecutor's role and influence; duty to avoid misleading jury)
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (prosecutorial remarks must not render trial unfair to violate due process)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless-error principles)
United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226 (prosecutorial misstatements can warrant reversal in close cases)
United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666 (prejudice inquiry: misconduct must be so gross as probably to prejudice and not neutralized by judge)
United States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110 (defendant must show it is more probable than not that misconduct materially affected verdict)
United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (contextual review of prosecutorial misconduct; judge’s curative actions examined)