United States v. Alexis Jaimez
45f4th1118
9th Cir.2022Background
- Canta Ranas Organization (CRO) is a hierarchical Southern California street gang tied to the Mexican Mafia; its core activities were methamphetamine distribution, extortion (collecting “taxes”), and funneling proceeds to incarcerated leaders.
- Alexis Jaimez was a low‑level CRO “foot soldier”; evidence showed he collected taxes, discussed making “happy cards” to smuggle drugs into prison, and committed violent acts on behalf of the gang.
- Government presented recorded calls, cooperating/witness testimony, and expert testimony explaining the CRO’s structure and the flow of extorted/drug proceeds up the chain (Loza → Gaitan → secretaries → incarcerated leader David Gavaldon).
- Jaimez was indicted on (and convicted of) drug distribution conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846), money laundering conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)), and RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)); sentenced to 200 months concurrent on each count.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit reviewed sufficiency of the evidence de novo and unobjected jury instructions for plain error; the majority affirmed all convictions.
- Judge Owens concurred in part but dissented as to the money laundering conspiracy, arguing the record lacked evidence that Jaimez knew the laundering objective or intended to further it.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence for drug distribution conspiracy | Gov't: Jaimez’s membership, recorded calls, discussions about drugs and “taxes,” violent acts, and role as foot soldier show knowledge and intent to further drug conspiracy | Jaimez: Insufficient proof he joined or intended to further the drug distribution conspiracy; he was not found possessing narcotics | Affirmed — circumstantial evidence and a "slight" knowing connection sufficed to convict under Collazo standard |
| Sufficiency of the evidence for money laundering conspiracy | Gov't: Structure of CRO, recorded calls, expert testimony, and Jaimez’s tax‑collection role allow inference he knew taxes were funneled to incarcerated leaders and intended to further laundering | Jaimez: No direct evidence he knew funds were being laundered to prison leaders; knowledge of others cannot be imputed to him | Affirmed — jury could reasonably infer knowledge and intent from the overall evidence and Jaimez’s contacts/role |
| Jury instruction on the term “knowingly” in money laundering charge | Gov't: Instruction in context and the substantive money‑laundering elements prevented prejudice | Jaimez: The generic “not required to prove unlawfulness” language could allow conviction without finding he knew proceeds were illegal | Affirmed — plain‑error review: any instructional ambiguity did not affect substantial rights given the unchallenged substantive instructions and record evidence |
| RICO conspiracy and reliance on predicate acts | Gov't: At least two predicate conspiracies (drug distribution and money laundering) were proven; extortion also independently sufficient | Jaimez: If one predicate lacks support, general verdict could be invalid | Affirmed — even if money laundering were insufficient, drug conspiracy and extortion provided the required pattern; Griffin/Choy reasoning permits affirmance when alternative predicates are factually supported |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Collazo, 984 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 2021) (a defendant need only show a "slight" knowing connection to a conspiracy)
- United States v. Perez, 962 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 2020) (sufficiency review views evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution)
- United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) (circumstantial evidence may prove knowledge for conspiracy convictions)
- Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991) (when multiple alternative objects are submitted, jury can be trusted to rest verdict on factually supported object)
- Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) (RICO conspiracy conviction does not require defendant to have personally committed predicate acts)
- United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2006) (jury may infer laundering participation from coded communications)
- United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1995) (general‑verdict reversal required where underlying objects are legally infirm and indistinguishable)
- United States v. Choy, 309 F.3d 602 (9th Cir. 2002) (applies Griffin distinction between legal error and factual insufficiency in conspiracy contexts)