977 F.3d 666
8th Cir.2020Background
- Coleman pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); district court applied ACCA enhancement and sentenced him to 192 months.
- Coleman challenged on appeal that two prior convictions are not ACCA “serious drug offenses.” He preserved a different objection at sentencing, so review requires plain-error analysis for the unpreserved claim.
- One prior: 2004 Missouri conviction for delivery/manufacture of an imitation controlled substance (class D felony; maximum 4 years).
- The other prior: 2003 Tennessee conviction under Tenn. Code § 39-17-417(a)(4) for possession of cocaine with intent to sell/deliver (indictment and judgment identify subsection (4)).
- Court applied the categorical/modified-categorical approach to compare statutory elements to ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense,” and examined Tennessee statutory definitions and related provisions to determine whether the state offense necessarily matches federal “manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute.”
- Holding: Missouri conviction is not an ACCA predicate (max 4 years); Tennessee conviction is a qualifying serious drug offense because “deliver”/“sell” as defined in Tennessee necessarily entails conduct equivalent to federal “distribute,” and Tennessee law excludes lawful medical administering/dispensing from criminal liability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Missouri imitation-controlled-substance conviction is an ACCA predicate | Coleman: class D imitation offense punishable by <10 years, so not a predicate | Gov: district court treated it as a predicate (but other predicates exist) | Court: Not a predicate (max 4 years) |
| Whether Tennessee § 39-17-417(a)(4) conviction qualifies as a “serious drug offense” under ACCA | Coleman: § 39-17-417 is broader than ACCA because it may reach conduct (e.g., administering/dispensing) that federal "distribute" does not cover | Gov: statute is divisible; Coleman was convicted under subsection (4) (possession with intent to sell/deliver), and Tennessee definitions/neighboring provisions limit scope to conduct equivalent to distribution | Court: Qualifies—possession with intent to sell/deliver necessarily entails intent to distribute; indictment shows subsection (4) was the basis for conviction |
| Whether Tennessee’s definition of “deliver” could criminalize lawful medical administering/dispensing (realistic-probability inquiry) | Coleman: realistic probability Tennessee prosecutes practitioners for administering/dispensing, so statute is broader than ACCA predicate | Gov: Tennessee code and case law carve out lawful administering/dispensing for practitioners; cited cases do not show prosecutions of lawful medical conduct | Court: Coleman failed to show a realistic probability; neighboring statutes show lawful administering/dispensing are not criminalized |
| Standard of review / preservation | Coleman: objected at sentencing on different grounds, so argues ACCA should not apply | Gov: unpreserved claim reviewed for plain error; substantive legal question reviewed de novo | Court: Applied plain-error framework for preservation issue and applied categorical analysis de novo to the predicate-offense question; ACCA still applies because Tennessee conviction qualifies |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishes categorical approach for predicate offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (distinguishes divisible statutes and authorizes modified categorical approach)
- Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020) (state-law “serious drug offense” inquiry focuses on statutory elements and conduct)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (approves use of indictment/judgment in the modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Vanoy, 957 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2020) (discusses divisible statutes and modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Goldston, 906 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2018) (construed Tenn. Code § 39-17-417 as divisible and held Tennessee law does not criminalize lawful dispensing/administering)
- McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011) (rejects interpretations that yield absurd results)