United States v. Alex Alexander
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2137
7th Cir.2014Background
- Alex Alexander was stopped after a traffic encounter in Rockford, IL; officer Honzel smelled marijuana, called a drug dog, and a subsequent search found packaged marijuana, a loaded gun under the front passenger seat, multiple cell phones, scales, and cash. Alexander was alone in the car.
- Alexander was charged in federal court with possession with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. §841), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime (18 U.S.C. §924(c)), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§922(g), 924(e)).
- At trial Alexander did not testify; defense theory was lack of knowledge/possession (car not his, no fingerprints/DNA on contraband). Defense challenged Officer Honzel’s credibility (e.g., mistaken street name, no recovered text messages, why wait for a dog if he smelled marijuana).
- In rebuttal the prosecutor argued, among other things, that Honzel had “no incentive … to falsely implicate the defendant” and referenced his oath of office, asserting Honzel told the truth. Defense did not object at trial.
- Jury convicted Alexander on all counts; district court sentenced him as a career offender to 390 months. On appeal Alexander argued for the first time that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for Honzel’s credibility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor impermissibly vouched for witness credibility during closing | Prosecutor vouched (expressed belief Honzel had no incentive to lie; invoked officer’s oath), which was improper and requires reversal | Government: remarks were mild, partly invited by defense attacks on credibility, and did not prejudice the verdict given strong evidence | Court: Two remarks crossed the line into improper vouching but were not plain error; conviction affirmed |
| Whether prosecutor’s “no incentive to lie” statement was improper | That statement implied undisclosed evidence about motive/truthfulness and thus constituted improper vouching | Government: distinguishable/harmless and defense invited response; comment was not outcome-determinative | Court: Statement was improper (analogous to Edwards/Cornett) but harmless in context |
| Whether referencing officer’s oath was permissible | Such reference bolstered credibility with facts outside the record and is improper | Government: overall argument was fair comment and not seriously prejudicial | Court: Reference to oath was improper but not plain error given trial context and evidence strength |
| Whether prosecutor’s other rebuttal comments were acceptable | N/A (focus on legitimacy of rebuttal strategy) | Government: comments about why officer would not fabricate a larger story were fair inferences/common-sense argument | Court: Those comments were permissible as reasonable inferences from the record |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Edwards, 581 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2009) (prosecutorial expressions of personal belief or implied undisclosed facts about witness credibility constitute improper vouching)
- United States v. Cornett, 232 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2000) (improper to bolster police credibility by referring to occupational oath or facts outside the record)
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (U.S. 1986) (standards for determining when improper prosecutorial argument violates a defendant’s right to a fair trial)
- United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206 (7th Cir. 2012) (analysis for prosecutorial misconduct when timely objection is made)
- United States v. Tucker, 714 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2013) (plain-error standard on unpreserved prosecutorial misconduct)
