United States v. Alejandro Umana
750 F.3d 320
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- Defendant Alejandro Umaña, an MS-13 member, shot and killed two brothers in Greensboro, NC; convicted by a jury of RICO conspiracy, murder in aid of racketeering (18 U.S.C. §1959(a)(1)), and murder during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. §§924(c), (j)(1)); jury rendered death sentence after eligibility and selection phases.
- Jury found two statutory aggravators (grave risk to others; multiple murders in a single episode) and four nonstatutory aggravators (protecting/advancing MS-13 status; harm to victims’ families; uncharged prior murders in Los Angeles; future dangerousness). Mitigating evidence included upbringing and indoctrination.
- Procedural posture: appeal to the Fourth Circuit raising venue, Commerce Clause, juror bias, admissibility of hearsay and custodial statements, Confrontation Clause at sentencing, Miranda/fifth‑amendment voluntariness, prosecutorial misconduct, Eighth Amendment proportionality, Atkins burden of proof, and other sentencing-evidence objections.
- Key contested evidence at selection: transcripts/hearsay of MS-13 members and interviews implicating Umaña in earlier Los Angeles murders; district court admitted these for sentencing, finding sufficient indicia of reliability and holding the Confrontation Clause inapplicable to the selection phase.
- District court rejected venue and Atkins challenges, found Umaña’s custodial statements validly Mirandized and voluntary, denied juror-bias challenges, admitted prior‑acts evidence for selection, and instructed jury; Fourth Circuit affirmed on all counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Umaña) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venue for §1959 and §924(c)/(j) counts | Venue proper only in Middle District (Greensboro) because murder is the sole conduct element and mens rea linking to enterprise is irrelevant for venue | Venue proper in Western District (Charlotte-centered) because the §1959 "for the purpose of...maintaining or increasing position" element requires objective conduct tying defendant to an interstate enterprise centered in Charlotte | Court held §1959’s "purpose" prong includes an objective conduct element linking defendant to the enterprise; Umaña’s acts in Charlotte supported venue in Western District; §924 venue likewise proper there because predicate conduct occurred there. |
| Commerce Clause challenge to §1959 | Murder to maintain gang status is non‑economic, local crime beyond Congress’s commerce power (cf. Morrison) | Congress could rationally conclude reputation-enhancing violence by members substantially affects interstate racketeering commerce; §1959 contains a jurisdictional interstate‑commerce element limiting scope | Rejected under plain‑error review: Congress had a rational basis; §1959’s jurisdictional element distinguishes it from Morrison; statute constitutional. |
| Confrontation Clause at sentence‑selection phase (admission of co‑conspirator hearsay about prior murders) | Sixth Amendment requires right to confront accusers throughout FDPA phases; admitting testimonial hearsay at selection that was critical to death decision violated confrontation and reliability principles | Confrontation Clause does not apply to sentencing/selection phase; Williams and subsequent precedent permit consideration of broader, reliable information at sentencing; hearsay admissible if sufficiently reliable | Held the Confrontation Clause does not bar introduction of hearsay at the selection phase of a federal capital trial; district court did not abuse discretion in admitting the statements and found them sufficiently reliable. |
| Juror bias (Jurors 286 and 119) | Juror 286’s traumatic family history and equivocal answers showed actual or implied bias; Juror 119’s answers showed she would not meaningfully consider life sentence | Trial court carefully probed both jurors; each affirmed ability to follow law and consider both penalties; voir dire assurances credible | No abuse of discretion: judge’s follow‑up questions cured equivocations; neither juror’s responses warranted excusal for actual or implied bias. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rodriguez-Moreno v. United States, 526 U.S. 275 (venue requires identifying conduct elements and locus of criminal acts)
- Cabrales v. United States, 524 U.S. 1 (location of acts determinative for venue)
- United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.) (venue jurisprudence re: conduct elements)
- United States v. Oceanpro Indus., Ltd., 674 F.3d 323 (4th Cir.) (mens rea does not determine locus for venue)
- United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (statute struck down where no jurisdictional commerce element)
- Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (Congress may regulate aggregated intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce)
- Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (sentencing may rely on information obtained outside trial testimony; Confrontation Clause not applied to sentencing in that context)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (Sixth Amendment jury‑finding requirement for aggravating factors used to render defendant death eligible)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause protects testimonial statements; cross‑examination is the prescribed reliability test)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (facts that increase mandatory minimums must be found by jury)