United States v. Albert Savani, 733 F.3d 56

Appellants Savani, Herbert, and Roe pled guilty to crack-related offenses and cooperated with government; they received substantial assistance departures below mandatory minimums.
Amendment 750 lowered crack-baseline offense levels retroactively after sentencing; the FSA increased thresholds for mandatory minimums.
Appellants filed 3582(c)(2) motions seeking further reductions based on Amendment 750; district courts denied.
Goverment initially supported departures below minimums but opposed later 3582(c)(2) reductions as the minimums had previously governed.
Doe held that those below the mandatory minimum were ineligible for reductions under 3582(c)(2); Amendment 759 defined ‘‘applicable guideline range,’’ potentially superseding Doe.
Court vacates lower courts’ decisions for Herbert and Roe and dismisses Savani’s appeal as moot due to Savani’s death; remands for proceedings consistent with Freeman and district court discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is a crack-cocaine offender who received a sub-minimum sentence due to substantial assistance eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief after Amendment 750/750?	Savani/Herbert/Roe contend yes; the range is lowered by Amendment 750 and thus eligible.	Government argues no; Doe controls; the original range was trumped by mandatory minimum.	Yes; defendants eligible for 3582(c)(2) relief; vacate and remand for proceedings.
Does Amendment 759 define ‘applicable guideline range’ to supersede Doe’s interpretation?	Petitioners rely on new 1B1.10 Application Note 1(A) to define range.	Government asserts ambiguity; Doe remains controlling.	Ambiguity exists; but Amendment 759 clarifies the range, supporting relief.
Should lenity be used to resolve ambiguity in the guideline range definition?	Lenity should apply if ambiguity remains after considering amendments.	Lenity not required given plain text language in Amendment 759.	Lenity applied by majority to resolve ambiguity in Petitioners’ favor.
Were petitioners’ sentences ‘based on’ a guideline range for § 3582(c)(2) purposes?	Herbert’s sentence was based on a guideline range; substantial assistance did not remove that basis.	Government argues offenses and departures predominate, not the range.	Yes; sentences were based on a guideline range.

United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305 (3d Cir.2009) (defined ‘applicable guideline range’ before amendments; Doe/2011 amendment interplay)
United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252 (3d Cir.2010) (interpreted 3582(c)(2) eligibility conditions after amendments)
United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir.2012) (Eleventh Circuit decision on Amendment 759 applicability)
United States v. Hippolyte, 712 F.3d 535 (11th Cir.2013) (contrasted with majority; discussed mandatory minimum interaction)
United States v. Ware, 694 F.3d 527 (3d Cir.2012) (career offender context for § 3582(c)(2) eligibility)
United States v. Barney, 672 F.3d 228 (3d Cir.2012) (career offender context; impact on § 3582(c)(2) eligibility)
United States v. Roa-Medina, 607 F.3d 255 (1st Cir.2010) (early circuit on departures and § 3582(c)(2) scope)