United States v. Adorno-Molina
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24047
| 1st Cir. | 2014Background
- Marva Adorno-Molina worked as a financing manager at a car dealership and, with co-conspirator Alberto Meléndez-Sáez, recruited "straw owners" to purchase vehicles that were delivered to members of Angel Ayala-Vazquez's drug trafficking organization (DTO).
- Adorno paid car-related expenses, met frequently with Meléndez (who visited her at least three times per week), and received cash from him; many cars acquired through the scheme were later used in crimes linked to Ayala's DTO.
- Adorno procured and paid rent for an apartment used by the DTO; a DEA search of the apartment uncovered drug packing materials, weapons-related items, $240,260 in cash, a DEA report on Ayala's DTO, and a vehicle registration in Adorno's name.
- Adorno was charged and convicted of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances (21 U.S.C. § 846) and (2) conspiracy to launder money (18 U.S.C. § 1956). She was sentenced to 121 months’ imprisonment (counts concurrent).
- On appeal Adorno challenged (a) sufficiency of evidence for the drug conspiracy conviction, (b) the money-laundering conviction under United States v. Santos (arguing proceeds must be net profits), (c) the district court’s willful-blindness jury instruction, and (d) sentencing calculations and notice regarding use of laundered funds to set the base offense level.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United States) | Defendant's Argument (Adorno) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for drug conspiracy conviction | Evidence (close relationship with Meléndez, repeated transactions, vehicles used in DTO crimes, Adorno paid for DTO apartment) shows Adorno knew and voluntarily participated in Ayala's conspiracy | Government failed to prove Adorno knew vehicles were being used for Ayala’s DTO; at most willful blindness or innocent assistance | Affirmed — circumstantial evidence supported a reasonable inference Adorno knew she was assisting Ayala’s DTO, so conviction stands |
| Meaning of "proceeds" under § 1956 in drug cases (Santos) | Santos, as construed by controlling concurrence, treats "proceeds" as gross receipts for narcotics/contraband sales; government proved gross revenues here | Santos requires "proceeds" = net profits; government did not prove net profits of drug sales | Affirmed — Santos’s controlling opinion (Justice Stevens) limits the plurality; for drug trafficking "proceeds" may mean gross revenues, so money‑laundering conviction stands |
| Appropriateness of willful-blindness jury instruction on money laundering | Evidence showed deliberate avoidance: straw-owner scheme, cash handoffs, vehicles linked to DTO, and Adorno’s warning to a straw owner; instruction appropriate | No sufficient facts to support willful blindness regarding source of laundered funds; instruction prejudicial | Affirmed — the record contained "flags" of suspicion warranting a willful-blindness instruction and it was not erroneous |
| Sentencing: use of laundered funds to calculate base offense level and Rule 32(h) notice | District court permissibly used value of laundered funds under U.S.S.G. §2S1.1(a)(2); Santos-era legislative amendment not retroactive; Rule 32(h) inapplicable to Guidelines-range sentence | Court failed to give Rule 32(h) notice before using laundered‑fund value; amount attributed ($1,153,137.30) inaccurate | Affirmed — Rule 32(h) does not apply to within-Guidelines calculations; district court’s laundered‑fund estimate was a reasonable loss estimate and no plain error shown |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (plurality and controlling concurrence about whether “proceeds” means profits or receipts; concurrence limits the plurality)
- Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (framework for determining controlling opinion when Court fragments)
- Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008) (Rule 32(h) applies to Guidelines "departures," not to within-Guidelines or § 3553 variances)
- United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (willful blindness instruction standards and inference from close ties to traffickers)
- United States v. Ihenacho, 716 F.3d 266 (1st Cir. 2013) (sufficiency review standard and sentencing loss-estimate deference)