United States v. Addario, 662 F. App'x 61

Andrew Bartok, owner of a company promising to "stop foreclosure without bankruptcy," was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy (mail/wire fraud), mail fraud, conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud/obstruction, bankruptcy fraud, conspiracy to commit witness tampering, false statements, and obstruction of justice. Sentenced to 22 years plus 3 years supervised release.
Scheme: solicited homeowners facing foreclosure with flyers and meetings, collected upfront and monthly fees, and represented that clients could repurchase homes at foreclosure auctions via legal "loopholes."
In practice Bartok (and co-conspirators) often filed bankruptcy petitions for clients without informing them, forged signatures on court documents, instructed clients to ignore bank/court notices, and used the automatic stay to halt foreclosures. No client repurchased a home using his methods.
Government proof included testimony from two cooperating managers, multiple client witnesses, expert bankruptcy testimony, and documentary evidence; the district court called the evidence of guilt "overwhelming."
On appeal Bartok challenged (1) admission of certain Rule 404(b) and spending/gambling evidence, and (2) the district court’s inclusion of a conscious-avoidance jury instruction; he also filed pro se supplemental arguments.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admission of prior false statements under Rule 404(b)	Evidence of prior false financial statements shows intent and is admissible to rebut defense theory	Prior acts are unfairly prejudicial and not probative of intent here	Admissible; even if erroneous, any error was harmless given overwhelming case against Bartok
Admission of spending/gambling records (Rule 403)	Spending and gambling show motive for fraud and are probative; not unduly prejudicial	Irrelevant because Bartok did not dispute income—only disputed fraudulence of earnings	Admissible as probative of motive; if error, harmless due to strong government evidence
Conscious-avoidance jury instruction	Instruction appropriate because evidence supported that Bartok may have been aware of a high probability of fraud and deliberately avoided confirming it	No factual predicate for conscious avoidance; instruction unfairly broadens culpability	Instruction proper given defense theory and evidence; alternatively, any error was harmless given proof of actual knowledge
Harmless-error/new-trial request	Any evidentiary or instruction errors would not have affected verdict in light of overwhelming evidence	Errors warrant new trial	Court affirmed conviction; errors (if any) were harmless and not reversible

United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2007) (standards for reviewing evidentiary rulings and harmless error)
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001) (abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2011) (harmless error analysis for evidentiary rulings)
United States v. Nektalov, 461 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2006) (standards for jury instructions and conscious avoidance)
United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537 (2d Cir. 1989) (government may charge actual knowledge and conscious avoidance alternatives)