United States v. Adan Garcia-Figueroa, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10978

In June 2012 Garcia‑Figueroa was arrested smuggling ~12–17 migrants across the Rio Grande in an inflatable raft and was later convicted by a jury of (1) conspiracy to bring illegal aliens, (2) bringing illegal aliens, and (3) unlawful presence after deportation.
The PSR grouped Counts 1 and 2 together, treated Count 3 separately, and recommended an adjusted offense level leading to a Guidelines range of 51–63 months (later revised to 63–78 after adjustments); the district court sentenced him to 70 months.
The PSR applied a 12‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on a prior Florida conviction for “attempted aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer with a law enforcement officer’s firearm.”
Garcia‑Figueroa objected to (a) the 12‑level crime‑of‑violence (COV) enhancement, (b) a 2‑level reckless‑endangerment enhancement (not resolved below as deemed academic), and (c) the failure to group Count 3 with Counts 1–2; the government sought a § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement for trial testimony perjury.
The district court upheld the COV enhancement and grouping decision, applied a § 3C1.1 enhancement, and imposed a within‑Guidelines 70‑month sentence. On appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed the COV enhancement but held the district court erred in refusing to group Count 3 with Counts 1–2, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Garcia‑Figueroa’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Whether prior Florida conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence" for the 12‑level § 2L1.2 enhancement	The Florida "attempted aggravated battery" conviction lacks physical‑force as an element and Florida’s "attempt" statute is broader than the generic meaning, so enhancement is improper	The prior conviction (charged as attempt to cause great bodily harm and/or use a firearm and also citing unlawful taking of an officer’s firearm) has an element of use/threatened use of force, so enhancement applies	Affirmed: conviction qualifies as a COV; Florida attempt not shown to be broader than the generic attempt standard, so 12‑level enhancement proper
Whether Counts 1–2 (conspiracy/smuggling) should have been grouped with Count 3 (illegal reentry) under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2	Counts arose from the same transaction and are immigration offenses that share the same societal victim; therefore they should be grouped	While transactionally related, Counts 1–2 had identifiable victims (the smuggled aliens) distinct from the societal interest in Count 3, so separate grouping was appropriate	Reversed: Counts 1, 2, and 3 should have been grouped together as immigration offenses harming the same societal interest; failure to group was not harmless error

United States v. Dominguez, 479 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2007) (Florida aggravated‑battery deadly‑weapon prong can qualify as a crime of violence)
United States v. Sanchez, 667 F.3d 555 (5th Cir. 2012) (framework for determining whether a state’s attempt statute matches the generic/Model Penal Code substantial‑step definition)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limited use of indictments/jury instructions to identify which disjunctive statutory alternative formed the basis of a conviction)
United States v. Garcia‑Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2013) (grouping analysis when multiple separate victims and distinct criminal objectives exist)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedural error at sentencing and appellate review standards)