United States v. Adams, 40 F.4th 1162

Defendant Briar Adams had a prior Kansas aggravated-battery conviction and was sentenced for unlawful firearm possession using the Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for a prior "crime of violence."
The district court treated Kansas aggravated battery as a qualifying "crime of violence," raising Adams’s offense level and producing a 51-month sentence.
Kansas law defines aggravated battery to apply when the defendant causes physical contact with "another person," and a separate definitional statute expressly includes an "unborn child" in the definition of "person."
Adams challenged the enhancement, arguing the Kansas statute encompasses fetal-battery conduct that would not meet the Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence.
The Tenth Circuit applied the categorical approach, considered whether the definitional provision created distinct crimes or merely alternative means, and analyzed whether the Guidelines’ term "person" includes fetuses under the Dictionary Act.
Holding: the Kansas aggravated-battery statute is a single crime that can be committed against a fetus; the Guidelines’ definition of "crime of violence" (via the Dictionary Act) limits "person" to those born alive; because the Kansas statute criminalizes conduct the Guidelines would not, the enhancement was improper — the sentence is vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Adams' Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Kansas aggravated battery is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(1)	Statute reaches fetal battery so does not necessarily have as an element use of physical force against a person as defined by the Guidelines	Aggravated battery is a crime of violence; in this case the conviction reflects battery of a born person	Not a crime of violence: categorical mismatch because Guidelines/Dictionary Act limit "person" to born-alive individuals
Whether Kansas definitional provision (including "unborn child") creates separate divisible crimes	The definitional provision is a means, not an element; aggravated battery is a single offense covering born and unborn victims	The definitional provision creates two separate offenses (divisible): one for born persons and one for fetuses	Single crime: the definitional provision supplies alternative means, not separate statutory elements; no divisibility for enhancement purposes
Whether the Guidelines' term "person" includes fetuses	"Person" in the Guidelines should be read to exclude fetuses (so some Kansas convictions fall outside the Guidelines)	The Dictionary Act's use of "includes" is illustrative and does not exclude fetal coverage; or the prior conviction was for a born person	"Person" under the Dictionary Act and administrative interpretation refers to those born alive; fetuses excluded; therefore mismatch exists

Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (categorical approach and elements-versus-means framework)
United States v. Taylor, 843 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.) (application of categorical approach to prior convictions)
United States v. O'Connor, 874 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir.) (comparing state statute elements to §4B1.2 definition)
State v. Castleberry, 339 P.3d 795 (Kan. 2014) (definitional provisions supply means, not separate elements)
State v. Seba, 380 P.3d 209 (Kan. 2016) (Kansas prosecuted separate counts for killing a pregnant woman and her unborn child)
United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir.) (Dictionary Act interpretation excluding fetuses)
Gomez Fernandez v. Barr, 969 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.) (concluding Dictionary Act excludes fetuses)
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (Sentencing Commission is an administrative agency relevant to construing Guidelines)
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (Guidelines are interpretive regulations entitled to deference)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (consideration of minimum conduct under categorical approach)