United States v. Adam Dyer
685 F. App'x 329
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Adam Patrick Dyer pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender and was sentenced in the Western District of Texas.
- At sentencing the court orally pronounced release conditions but the written judgment included ten additional special conditions that were not announced in court.
- Dyer did not have an opportunity to object to those ten conditions because they were not orally imposed.
- The government argued three of the conditions (sex‑offender treatment including polygraph, polygraph as a stand‑alone condition, and search condition) were covered by the district court’s Standing Order and thus Dyer had notice.
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed the unannounced special conditions for abuse of discretion and examined whether each condition was mandatory, standard, recommended by the Guidelines, or authorized by the Standing Order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether written special conditions not pronounced at sentencing conflict with the oral pronouncement and must be removed | Unannounced conditions deprived Dyer of his right to be present and object; remove them | Some conditions were included in the district Standing Order so Dyer had notice | Judgment vacated in part and remanded to remove unannounced special conditions except residence‑approval condition |
| Whether residence must be approved in advance by probation (special condition five) is permissible without oral announcement | Dyer argued it was not a standard/mandatory condition and should be deleted | Government pointed to U.S.S.G. §5D1.3(c)(5) treating residence‑approval as standard | Court upheld the residence‑approval condition as consistent with Guidelines and not in conflict with oral pronouncement |
| Whether sex‑offender treatment and polygraph requirement can be imposed without oral pronouncement | Dyer argued treatment and polygraph are not mandatory/standard for failure‑to‑register and require case‑specific findings | Government relied on Standing Order to show notice and authorization | Court held sex‑offender treatment (including polygraph) is not standard/mandatory; must be orally imposed with findings — delete from judgment |
| Whether search condition (searches by law enforcement/probation on reasonable suspicion) may be applied via written judgment without oral pronouncement | Dyer argued it was not imposed at sentencing and thus invalid | Government argued Standing Order authorized it | Court held search condition conflicted with oral pronouncement and Standing Order requires judge to impose it at sentencing — delete from judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2006) (unannounced special conditions reviewed for abuse of discretion; defendant has right to be present to object)
- United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001) (oral pronouncement controls over conflicting written judgment because defendant has right to be present at sentencing)
- United States v. Torres‑Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934 (5th Cir. 2003) (conditions listed in Guidelines may be treated as standard if defendant meets Guidelines' requirements)
- United States v. Vega, 332 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2003) (special conditions may be authorized by a district court standing order but must not conflict with oral pronouncement)
- United States v. Segura, 747 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2014) (failure to register is not categorized as a sex offense under the Guidelines)