United States v. Ackerly, 1:16-cr-10233

Donna Ackerly and codefendants are charged in a bribery/conspiracy indictment; Ackerly moved to sever her trial from the others.
Ackerly sought severance on two grounds: (1) stress from delay related to her status as a breast cancer survivor could harm her health; (2) prejudicial evidentiary "spillover" from extensive evidence against codefendants might taint her trial.
The government opposed severance, emphasizing the preference for joint trials to avoid inconsistent verdicts and conserve resources; it offered to accelerate the schedule within practical limits.
The court evaluated Rule 14/severance principles, noting the strong preference for joint trials in conspiracy cases and that peripheral involvement does not per se require severance.
The court found the medical/scientific causation issue (stress causing cancer recurrence/progression) was unsettled and legally irrelevant to the severance standard; it elected to address the speedy-trial concern by prioritizing scheduling rather than severing.
Conclusion: the court denied the motion to sever but committed to giving the trial the earliest feasible date while respecting all defendants' preparation rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether joint trial should be severed due to prejudicial evidentiary "spillover"	Ackerly: substantial evidence against codefendants will unfairly spill over to her and prejudice the jury	Government: joint trial preferred; evidence largely overlaps and separate trials would duplicate witnesses/evidence	Denied — joint trial appropriate; spillover not shown to present such prejudice that severance is required
Whether joint trial should be severed due to defendant's medical condition/stress from delay	Ackerly: breast cancer survivor; stress from prolonged wait risks recurrence/health harm, warranting severance or speedy resolution	Government: willing to accelerate scheduling but opposes severance; separate trial would duplicate effort and is inefficient	Denied — medical causation uncertain and legal standard focuses on prejudice to trial rights; court committed to earliest practicable scheduling instead of severance

United States v. Rodriguez-Reyes, 714 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013) (strong preference for trying defendants indicted together to avoid inconsistent verdicts and conserve resources)
United States v. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (favoring joint trials of co-defendants)
Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (U.S. 1993) (severance under Rule 14 required only when joint trial would compromise a specific trial right or prevent reliable jury verdict)
United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632 (1st Cir. 1980) (no abuse of discretion denying severance where separate trials would repeat the same evidence)
United States v. O’Bryant, 998 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1993) (lesser involvement does not automatically require severance)
United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002 (1st Cir. 1995) (when evidence is independently admissible against co-defendants, spillover claims are weak)
United States v. Searing, 984 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1993) (in conspiracy cases, severance is rarely required)
United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409 (1st Cir. 1994) (similar rule in conspiracy context)
United States v. Pierro, 32 F.3d 611 (1st Cir. 1994) (prejudice from evidentiary spillover must be so pervasive that a miscarriage of justice looms)