United States v. Abu Khatallah
275 F. Supp. 3d 32
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Abu Khatallah was arrested in Benghazi on June 15, 2014 on a warrant charging him in the 2012 Benghazi attacks; he was seized by a U.S. capture team and transferred to the USS New York.
- He was interrogated first by U.S. intelligence personnel (unwarned) for several days and then, after a two‑day gap, by FBI agents aboard the USS New York who gave multiple written and verbal Miranda warnings and obtained written waivers across six interview days.
- The United States considered transporting him via a foreign transfer‑of‑custody (FTOC) through third countries but made only one formal FTOC request (to “G‑24”), which was denied; logistical, diplomatic, and security concerns informed that choice.
- The voyage to the U.S. experienced engine problems that slowed the ship for a period and added roughly a day‑and‑a‑half delay, but the captain credibly testified the delays were mechanical, not directed by interrogators.
- Abu Khatallah moved to suppress the FBI‑obtained statements on grounds including (1) violation of prompt‑presentment (Rule 5) by the ~13‑day delay, (2) undermined Miranda waivers due to a two‑step interrogation, (3) involuntary / unknowing Miranda waivers, (4) invocation of right to counsel, and (5) involuntariness of custodial statements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument (Abu Khatallah) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prompt presentment under Rule 5(a) / McNabb‑Mallory and 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) | Delay was reasonable given distance, means of transport, national‑security and diplomatic reasons; FTOC was attempted and the ship transit was a lawful, reasonable choice | Ship transport was selected to maximize interrogation time; government did not seriously pursue FTOC and deliberately engineered delay to obtain statements | Denied. 13‑day delay was reasonable under circumstances (warranted arrest, security/diplomatic constraints, one FTOC request, mechanical delays); statements not suppressed on presentment grounds |
| Two‑step interrogation (Seibert) — whether midstream warnings effective | The prewarning intelligence interviews were for intelligence (national security) not to procure trial confessions; FBI interviews were separated in time, personnel, setting and included express curative language | Two‑step process was designed to thwart Miranda and make midstream warnings ineffective | Denied. Under either Seibert plurality or Kennedy concurrence tests the warned statements were admissible: no deliberate tactic to thwart Miranda, meaningful break/change in context, curative warnings that prior statements "probably will not be used" |
| Whether Miranda waivers were knowing and voluntary | Waivers were given in Arabic, repeatedly, in writing and verbally; defendant was alert, received breaks and humane treatment, and initialed forms reserving future counsel | Prior forceful abduction, prior Libyan imprisonments, limited education and unfamiliarity with U.S. law rendered waivers unknowing/coerced | Denied. Court found waivers voluntary, knowing and intelligent on the totality of circumstances (multiple written and verbal advisals, comprehension, conduct, breaks, humane treatment) |
| Invocation of right to counsel | Agents reasonably continued after ambiguous inquiry; defendant’s question was equivocal and he expressly waived present counsel while reserving it later | Asking “Is there an attorney here?” constituted an invocation requiring cessation | Denied. Question was ambiguous/equivocal (Davis standard); not an unambiguous invocation requiring cessation |
| Voluntariness of custodial statements (Due Process) | No coercive police conduct; humane conditions, frequent breaks, opportunity to refuse answers; statements voluntary | Cumulative coercion from capture, isolation, prior interrogations and voyage rendered statements involuntary | Denied. Statements found voluntary under totality of circumstances; intelligence statements (unwarned) voluntary but inadmissible in case‑in‑chief (allowed for impeachment) |
Key Cases Cited
- Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (reaffirming McNabb‑Mallory framework and § 3501(c) analysis)
- McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (establishing exclusionary rule for unreasonable pre‑arraignment delay)
- Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (delay for interrogation is ‘‘epitome of unnecessary delay’’)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warning and waiver principles)
- Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (plurality and Kennedy standards for two‑step interrogation)
- United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (overseas arrest, planned capture, multi‑day transport and presentment analysis)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (validity of postwarning statements when warnings cure earlier unwarned admissions)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (right‑to‑counsel invocation must be unambiguous)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (prohibition on further interrogation after an unambiguous request for counsel)
- Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (standards for knowing and voluntary Miranda waiver)
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (voluntariness requires coercive police conduct)