United States v. Abel Tavera
719 F.3d 705
6th Cir.2013Background
- Abel Martinez Tavera was tried and convicted for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine after police found drugs hidden under nails in a truck he was riding in as a passenger.
- Co-defendant Placido Mendoza drove the truck; Guadalupe Granado (co-defendant) was the government’s primary witness implicating Tavera.
- Weeks before Tavera’s trial, Mendoza gave the prosecutor (AUSA Taylor) debriefing statements saying Tavera did not know about the drugs; Mendoza later pleaded guilty and his written plea allocution recanted that initial, exculpatory account.
- The prosecutor did not disclose Mendoza’s earlier exculpatory statements to Tavera or his counsel; Tavera did not interview Mendoza and was in custody at trial.
- Tavera was convicted and sentenced to 186 months; on appeal he argued the nondisclosure violated Brady. The Sixth Circuit majority vacated and remanded for a new trial; Judge Clay dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mendoza’s pre-plea statements were "suppressed" under Brady | Tavera: prosecutor had duty to disclose Mendoza’s exculpatory statements; defendant and counsel reasonably lacked access | Government: defendant or counsel should have discovered the statements (due diligence); no suppression if defendant could have found witness | Majority: suppression—prosecutor’s duty is independent; Banks rejects placing burden on defendant; nondisclosure was suppression |
| Whether the undisclosed statements were material (prejudice) | Tavera: statements corroborated his testimony and undermined government’s key witness (Granado); reasonable probability of a different result | Government: other evidence supported conviction (calls, Granado’s testimony, plea allocution, physical evidence) so withheld statements were not material | Majority: material—statements could have undermined confidence in verdict; vacated conviction and remanded for new trial |
| Role of Sixth Circuit precedent on defendant-due-diligence (availability) | Tavera: Banks controls and rejects broad due-diligence gloss that would excuse nondisclosure | Government/Dissent: binding Sixth Circuit cases require defendant diligence and defeat Brady claim where defendant knew witness and didn’t pursue them | Court: majority follows Supreme Court (Banks) over the circuit due-diligence gloss and declines to adopt that defense; dissent would apply existing Sixth Circuit holdings and affirm conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose material exculpatory evidence)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (elements of Brady claim; materiality standard)
- Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (rejects rule shifting burden to defendant to discover evidence; emphasizes prosecutor’s role in truth-seeking)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (Brady materiality defined as reasonable probability undermining confidence in outcome)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality assessed in context of entire record)
- United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1986) (conspiracy intent standards referenced)
- Benge v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 236 (6th Cir. 2007) ( Sixth Circuit precedent holding defendant’s knowledge of witness can negate Brady claim)