United States v. Abdur Islam, 102 F.4th 143

Defendants Abdur Rahim Islam and Shahied Dawan were indicted for conspiracy to commit racketeering, wire fraud, tax fraud, and other offenses related to their management of Universal Community Homes and Universal Education Companies.
The trial was lengthy (nearly six weeks), resulting in dismissal and replacement of multiple jurors for personal emergencies and illness—ultimately reducing the panel to the minimum constitutional number.
After further juror loss due to COVID-19, the District Court declared a mistrial when the defendants refused to proceed with eleven jurors, citing "manifest necessity."
Islam and Dawan moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds before retrial, arguing the mistrial was not manifestly necessary and thus retrial was barred.
The District Court denied the motion; retrial proceeded, resulting in Islam’s conviction and Dawan’s limited conviction under a superseding indictment.
On appeal, the court reviewed the propriety of the mistrial declaration and the double jeopardy claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the mistrial was manifestly necessary and double jeopardy bars retrial	Islam: The mistrial was not necessary; alternatives like adjourning for juror illness were not fully explored, so retrial is barred	U.S.: All reasonable alternatives were considered; manifest necessity justified the mistrial, so retrial is permissible	The district court's decision was upheld: mistrial was manifestly necessary, and double jeopardy does not bar retrial
Whether Dawan’s appeal is moot after retrial and acquittal/conviction on new charges	Dawan: Double jeopardy precludes retrial on all charges	U.S.: Superseding indictment charged a new offense and all other counts resulted in acquittal, so no live double jeopardy issue remains	Dawan’s appeal dismissed as moot
Whether dismissal of a juror for emotional distress was an abuse of discretion that led to the mistrial	Islam: Judge too readily dismissed a juror, which was the proximate cause of lacking a full panel	U.S.: The judge thoroughly considered alternatives and made a reasonable, discretionary decision to dismiss the juror	Dismissal of the juror was not an abuse of discretion
Applicability of manifest necessity in differing trial contexts	Islam: Prior case law suggests more alternatives should have been explored	U.S.: This case more closely resembles jury deadlock scenarios, where broad discretion is permitted	The court agreed that broad discretion and manifest necessity applied

Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (discusses the manifest necessity standard for declaring mistrials)
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (double jeopardy is not absolute; manifest necessity justifies mistrials)
United States v. Rivera, 384 F.3d 49 (3d Cir. 2004) (manifest necessity cannot be mechanically defined; high degree of necessity required)
United States v. Penn, 870 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2017) (trial courts have broad discretion for juror substitution)
Love v. Morton, 112 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 1997) (manifest necessity requires consideration of alternatives before declaring mistrial)
United States v. Pharis, 298 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2002) (mistrial not justified where clear alternatives exist)
United States v. McKoy, 591 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (same; requires careful consideration of alternatives)