United States v. Abdul Howard, 650 F. App'x 466

Background

Defendant Abdul Howard convicted of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
Howard contended Hobbs Act robbery can be committed by creating "fear of injury," which he argued does not necessarily involve the statutory "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" required by § 924(c)(3)(A).
The district court denied mistrial and refused to dismiss two jurors after allegations of juror irregularities and an external phone call; Howard challenged those rulings on appeal.
The Ninth Circuit considered whether Hobbs Act robbery falls within § 924(c)’s "force clause" and whether the district court abused its discretion handling alleged juror misconduct.
The panel affirmed: (1) Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A); (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in addressing juror issues or in concluding no prejudice from the external contact.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause)	Prosecution: Hobbs Act robbery includes "actual or threatened force" and therefore meets the force-clause definition.	Howard: Because the Hobbs Act also criminalizes obtaining property by causing "fear of injury," it can be violated without threatened or physical force and thus is not categorically a crime of violence.	Affirmed: Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under the force clause; fear-based robbery equates to threatened use of physical force per precedent.
Whether jury irregularities required a mistrial or juror dismissal	Government: District court adequately investigated and questioned jurors; no reasonable likelihood of prejudice; dismissal not required.	Howard: Juror 3 sought dismissal after a phone call referencing Juror 13; external contact presumptively prejudicial and warranted dismissal/mistrial.	Affirmed: District court reasonably found Juror 3’s dismissal motivated by health concerns, Juror 13 could continue, and no prejudice resulted from the external contact.
Whether a presumption of prejudice applied to the third-party phone call and was rebutted	Government: Any presumption was overcome because contact was not shown to influence verdict.	Howard: Circuit’s bright-line rule presumes prejudice from external juror contact, shifting burden to government to show harmlessness.	Affirmed: Even if presumption applied, district court reasonably concluded no prejudice; outcome same under either framing.
Whether the district court abused discretion in limiting the juror-hearing scope	Government: Court’s limited hearing was sufficient, with counsel present and questioning of jurors.	Howard: Hearing was too limited to probe potential internals or prejudice.	Affirmed: Court acted within its discretion; hearing was reasonably calculated to resolve allegations.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Mendez, 992 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognized Hobbs Act robbery as a crime of violence under § 924(c))
United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990) (held bank robbery by intimidation satisfies threatened physical-force requirement)
United States v. Hopkins, 703 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1983) (definition of "intimidation" as causing a reasonable person to fear bodily harm)
United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999) (limits on inquiry into juror deliberations and when dismissal is barred)
United States v. Vartanian, 476 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Symington where misconduct is externally identifiable and investigable)
Tarango v. McDaniel, 815 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2016) (bright-line rule: external juror contact gives rise to presumption of prejudice)
Caliendo v. Warden of Cal. Men's Colony, 365 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2004) (external communications trigger risk of influencing verdict)
United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981) (whether framed as presumption of prejudice or trial fairness, result can be the same)