891 F.3d 334
7th Cir.2018Background
- Aaron Schock resigned from Congress in 2015; 20 months later he was indicted on mail/wire fraud, theft of government funds, false statements to Congress/FEC, and false tax returns related to reimbursement and reporting of travel and office-furnishing expenses.
- Schock moved to dismiss, arguing the Speech or Debate Clause and the Rulemaking Clause barred the prosecution or required that only the House interpret its reimbursement rules.
- The district court denied the motion; Schock filed an interlocutory appeal challenging both clauses as defenses to prosecution.
- The Speech or Debate Clause was pleaded as a personal immunity that could support immediate appeal; the Rulemaking Clause was advanced as an institutional separation-of-powers defense that would make trial and conviction improper absent House interpretation.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial as to the Speech or Debate Clause (finding reimbursements/claims were not legislative acts) and dismissed the interlocutory appeal to the extent it relied on the Rulemaking Clause (holding no personal immunity and thus no interlocutory jurisdiction).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Speech or Debate Clause bars prosecution | Schock: reimbursements tied to legislative work are protected; immunity supports interlocutory appeal | Government: claims for reimbursement are not speeches/debates or legislative acts and thus not protected | Denied as to Speech or Debate; reimbursements are not legislative acts and immunity does not apply; interlocutory appeal permitted on this ground |
| Whether Rulemaking Clause bars judicial interpretation/prosecution | Schock: House alone makes and interprets its rules; ambiguity in rules prevents prosecution and requires House determination first | Government: Rulemaking power does not confer exclusive interpretive or personal immunity; courts routinely interpret rules and statutes of other branches | No interlocutory review; Rulemaking Clause creates institutional, not personal, rights—must await final judgment |
| Whether institutional separation-of-powers claims permit interlocutory appeal | Schock: collateral-order doctrine / pendent appellate jurisdiction allow immediate review of important separation-of-powers claim | Government: collateral-order doctrine in criminal cases is narrow; institutional claims do not create a right not to be tried | Dismissed: interlocutory appeals limited to personal immunities (e.g., Speech or Debate, Double Jeopardy); institutional claims must await final appeal |
| Whether Rule of Lenity/ambiguity requires pretrial resolution | Schock: genuine ambiguity in House rules should preclude conviction under rule of lenity | Government: ambiguity alone does not create pretrial immunity; can be raised on final appeal or at trial | May be raised on final appeal or at trial; not grounds for interlocutory appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (Speech or Debate Clause can create personal immunity supporting interlocutory appeal)
- Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (Speech or Debate protects legislative acts and committee investigations within legislative sphere)
- United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (Speech or Debate Clause does not shield illegal conduct merely because it relates to legislative functions)
- Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963) (Congressional rules are judicially cognizable)
- Midland Asphalt Co. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794 (1989) (interlocutory appeals in criminal cases confined to rights amounting to immunity from trial)
- United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (Speedy Trial Clause claims generally must await final judgment)
- United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (vindictive prosecution claims must await final judgment)
- Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (collateral-order doctrine described; applied narrowly in criminal context)
- Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (collateral-order doctrine’s limits in civil cases)
- Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (double jeopardy interlocutory appeal permitted; other defenses not extending to immediate appeal)
- Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (permitted interlocutory review of forcible medication issue)
- Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (individual members lack standing to assert institutional prerogatives)
- United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Speech-or-Debate defenses to fraud/claims prosecutions have failed)