United States v. Aaron Pruett, 16-56858

Defendant Aaron Scott Pruett pleaded guilty in 1996 to armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),(d)) and to using/carrying a firearm during the robbery (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).
He was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on two prior California robbery convictions (Cal. Penal Code § 211).
Pruett filed a § 2255 motion arguing that the residual clauses of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1) are unconstitutionally vague under Johnson v. United States.
The panel reviewed de novo and noted that, at the time of sentencing, both federal armed robbery and California robbery were recognized in this circuit as crimes of violence under the force clause (i.e., they have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force).
Because the convictions independently satisfied the force clauses, the sentencing did not rely on the residual clauses; thus Johnson-based challenges to the residual clause did not make Pruett’s § 2255 motion timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of § 2255 relief; a concurrence agreed with the outcome but discussed a different approach to timeliness when intervening Supreme Court decisions change the law.

Issue	Pruett's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Johnson renders Pruett's § 2255 timely because residual clauses were unconstitutionally vague	Residual clauses of § 924(c)(3) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1) are void for vagueness under Johnson, so his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution and § 2255(f)(3) tolls timeliness	Pruett’s convictions already qualified as crimes of violence under the force clause at sentencing, so the court did not rely on residual clauses; Johnson does not render his § 2255 timely	Denied — convictions qualified under force clause, so residual-clause invalidation does not make § 2255 timely; denial affirmed
Whether a later change in Supreme Court law can make a preexisting sentence timely under § 2255 even if the sentence originally rested on force-clause reasoning (concurrence)	(Illustrative hypo) A defendant sentenced under a force-clause theory should still be able to seek § 2255 relief if subsequent case law later invalidates the residual clause relied upon elsewhere	Majority treats the state of the law at sentencing as dispositive for timeliness; concurrence disagrees and would not bar relief solely because the sentencing court could have relied on a now-questioned clause	Concurrence would allow a different timeliness analysis; majority did not reach this broader § 2255(f)(3) reading and affirmed on the ground that force-clause predicates remain intact

United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause)
United States v. David H., 29 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1994) (California robbery includes threatened use of physical force)
United States v. Swisher, 811 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 2016) (standard of review: de novo for § 2255 legal questions)
United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2017) (timeliness and whether record shows reliance on residual clause)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (residual clause found unconstitutionally vague)
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (treatment of advisory Guidelines and scope of Johnson-type challenges)
United States v. Chavez-Cuevas, 862 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2017) (California robbery is a crime of violence under force-clause analysis)
United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) (federal armed robbery satisfies § 924(c)(3) force-clause predicate)