United States v. Aaron Harris, 907 F.3d 1095

Aaron Michael Harris pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced based on an increased Guidelines range.
The district court treated Harris’s 2013 Missouri conviction for second-degree domestic assault (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.073.1(2)) as a qualifying "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines force clause, USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1).
The Missouri statute under which Harris was convicted criminalized recklessly causing serious physical injury to a family or household member.
The parties agreed the modified categorical approach governs and that the inquiry is whether the statute’s elements necessarily involve the use of physical force against another person.
The Eighth Circuit has previously held that statutes criminalizing reckless conduct (e.g., reckless driving causing injury) do not satisfy the force clause because ordinary recklessness does not require physical force.
The court concluded Missouri’s second-degree domestic assault statute mirrors the earlier second-degree assault provision and therefore also covers reckless conduct; it is not a crime of violence under the Guidelines.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Harris’s 2013 Missouri conviction is a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines force clause	Harris argued the prior conviction did not require use of physical force and thus did not qualify	Government argued the conviction qualified as a crime of violence (government waived an alternative enumerated-offenses argument)	The court held the Missouri statute criminalizes reckless conduct and does not meet the force clause; conviction is not a crime of violence

United States v. Fields, 863 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2017) (held a statute criminalizing reckless conduct does not satisfy the force clause)
United States v. Ossana, 638 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2011) (explained reckless conduct does not require physical force for force-clause purposes)