United States v. Aaron Graham
824 F.3d 421
| 4th Cir. | 2016Background
- Defendants Graham and Jordan were convicted of armed robberies; the Government used historical cell-site location information (CSLI) from Sprint/Nextel to place them near the crime scenes.
- Historical CSLI are provider-generated business records identifying which cell tower/sector handled calls/texts; these are created in the provider’s ordinary course to route communications.
- The Government obtained the CSLI via court orders under the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)), not by using a warrant supported by probable cause.
- A prior Fourth Circuit panel held the warrantless acquisition violated the Fourth Amendment; the en banc court granted rehearing to resolve the issue.
- The en banc Fourth Circuit held that acquisition of historical CSLI from a provider pursuant to § 2703(d) did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search under the Supreme Court’s third‑party doctrine.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Government’s acquisition of historical CSLI from a phone provider without a warrant is a Fourth Amendment search | Government: No search; CSLI is voluntarily conveyed to a third party and thus unprotected under the third‑party doctrine; acquisition via § 2703(d) orders is lawful | Graham/Jordan: CSLI is not voluntarily conveyed, is highly sensitive/location data, and requires a warrant supported by probable cause | Held: No Fourth Amendment violation; third‑party doctrine controls—users voluntarily convey CSLI to providers and non‑content routing data are not protected, so § 2703(d) orders suffice |
| Whether the quantity/aggregation of long‑term CSLI transforms non‑content records into a constitutionally protected search | Government: Quantity does not change the third‑party rule; Congress provided statutory safeguards (SCA) | Defendants: Long‑term, high‑volume CSLI reveals detailed movements (like GPS) and should be protected (warrant required) | Held: Aggregation does not alter the third‑party analysis; courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent—policy or legislative changes should come from Congress or the Supreme Court |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (third‑party doctrine: no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to telephone company)
- United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no Fourth Amendment protection for bank records voluntarily conveyed to banks)
- United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (warrant required where government used tracking device to obtain information from within a private residence)
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (use of technology to obtain information about the interior of the home can be a search)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (installation and long‑term use of GPS device on vehicle was a search; concerns about long‑term location monitoring)
- United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) (CSLI treated as non‑content; third‑party doctrine applies)
- United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. en banc 2015) (held no reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI obtained via § 2703(d))
- In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (CSLI obtainable under § 2703(d) without Fourth Amendment implication)