United States v. $1,106,775 in US Currency
131 F.4th 710
9th Cir.2025Background
- During a traffic stop in Nevada officers found $1,106,775 in vacuum‑sealed cash in Oak Porcelli’s rented SUV; DEA seized the currency and the government filed a civil forfeiture in rem.
- Porcelli initially told officers the cash was “petty cash” for a production company, later filed a verified claim asserting he owned all the currency, and moved to suppress evidence from the stop.
- The government served Supplemental Rule G(6) special interrogatories about Porcelli’s identity and his relationship to the currency; Porcelli gave terse, vague answers (saying the money came from past movie‑industry work) and refused to further amend despite court orders.
- The district court struck Porcelli’s claim under Supp. R. G(8) for noncompliance and entered default judgment of forfeiture; Porcelli appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit majority affirmed: Rule G(6) permits narrow standing‑related interrogatories “at any time,” claimants must provide some evidence of Article III standing in discovery (though government retains ultimate burden under CAFRA), and striking the claim was not an abuse of discretion given Porcelli’s evasiveness and defiance.
- A vigorous dissent warned that the sanction shortcut risks rewarding illegal searches, impermissibly leveraging Rule G(6) to evade Fourth Amendment review, and may in practice pressure claimants to prove legitimacy of seized property prematurely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Porcelli) | Defendant's Argument (U.S.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope/timing of Supp. R. G(6): may gov't serve standing interrogatories after pleading stage? | Rule G(6) only tests standing at the pleading stage; once claimant asserts ownership and possession, further G(6) probing is improper. | Rule G(6) allows special interrogatories “at any time” before close of discovery to probe claimant’s identity and relationship to the property. | Held: G(6) authorizes timing and content the gov’t used; it can probe standing throughout litigation when standing is reasonably in dispute. |
| Do G(6) interrogatories impermissibly shift the burden of proof to claimant? | Requiring detailed ownership responses forces claimant to prove legitimacy, contrary to CAFRA (government bears preponderance burden). | Narrow standing discovery does not shift the statutory burden; it merely tests whether claimant has Article III standing. | Held: No impermissible burden shift; courts must avoid interrogatories that would effectively require proof by preponderance, but reasonable standing evidence is required. |
| Was striking the claim and default judgment an abuse of discretion? | Porcelli provided sufficient information (employment, companies, account references); terminating sanction was too severe. | Porcelli repeatedly defied court orders and gave vague, evasive responses despite minimal burden to supplement. | Held: No abuse of discretion—striking was justified given government evidence casting doubt, the vagueness of responses, and repeated refusal to comply. |
| Must court resolve claimant’s motion to suppress (Fourth Amendment) before ruling on G(8) strike? | Yes—if suppression could exclude tainted evidence (amount, statements), courts should decide suppression first to avoid rewarding unlawful searches. | Standing is threshold; G(6)/G(8) can be resolved first where standing is in dispute and discovery is about standing. | Held: Court may resolve G(6)/G(8) issues without first deciding suppression; but district courts must guard against using G(6) to short‑circuit Fourth Amendment protections. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. $133,420 in U.S. Currency, 672 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rule G(6) permits government to seek information on claimant’s relationship to defendant property to test standing)
- United States v. Real Prop. Located at 17 Coon Creek Rd., 787 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015) (failure to respond when standing is reasonably in dispute can warrant striking claim)
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing must be shown with the manner and degree of evidence required at successive stages)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (standing may be challenged at any stage of litigation)
- United States v. $493,850.00, 518 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2008) (court cannot consider amount of illegally seized currency when deciding forfeiture merits)
- United States v. $17,900 in U.S. Currency, 859 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (requiring more than “some evidence” of ownership risks shifting the merits burden to claimants)
- In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal for continued discovery noncompliance)
- United States v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Acct. No. Ending 8215, 835 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing possessory and ownership standing and evidentiary standards)