United States Ex Rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp.
420 U.S. App. D.C. 176
| D.C. Cir. | 2015Background
- MWI sold irrigation pumps to Nigeria and obtained eight Export-Import Bank loans totaling $74.3 million; MWI certified in 58 documents that it paid only “regular commissions” to its sales agent.
- Relator Purcell alleged MWI paid $28 million in commissions to a long‑term Nigerian agent (Indimi) that were not “regular,” and the United States intervened under the False Claims Act (FCA).
- The district court adopted the Government’s industry‑wide meaning of “regular commissions,” submitted falsity and knowledge to a jury, which found liability and $7.5 million in actual damages (trebled to $22.5M), later offset to zero based on Nigeria’s loan repayments; civil penalties were imposed.
- Government appealed the offset ruling; MWI cross‑appealed arguing as a matter of law it lacked the requisite FCA knowledge because the term “regular commissions” was ambiguous and MWI’s interpretation was reasonable.
- The D.C. Circuit held the meaning of “regular commissions” was ambiguous and MWI’s individual‑agent interpretation was objectively reasonable; because the Government failed to show the Bank or an authoritative source warned MWI away from that interpretation, the Government did not prove MWI acted knowingly.
- The court reversed and directed entry of judgment for MWI; it declined to address the damages offset issue due to disposition on knowledge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MWI knowingly presented false claims under the FCA | MWI paid excessive commissions that exceeded any industry norm, so it knew certifications were false | MWI had a reasonable, good‑faith interpretation that “regular commissions” meant commissions consistent with what it historically paid an individual agent | Reversed: Government failed to prove knowledge because there was no authoritative guidance warning MWI away from its reasonable interpretation |
| Whether the ambiguous term “regular commissions” precludes FCA liability as a matter of law | Term should be construed industry‑wide; ambiguity did not excuse nondisclosure of large commissions | The term is ambiguous and an objectively reasonable individual‑agent interpretation defeats knowledge | Term is ambiguous; objective reasonableness of MWI’s interpretation precludes a finding of knowledge absent authoritative warning |
| Whether informal or internal signals from the Bank sufficed to ‘warn away’ MWI’s interpretation | Bank officials’ informal comments (e.g., ~5%) and internal concern at MWI show notice or recklessness | Informal comments are not authoritative; subjective employee concerns are irrelevant to objective knowledge standard | Informal guidance and internal worries are insufficient to show the Bank warned MWI away from its reasonable view |
| Whether the size of the commissions alone proves knowledge | Large commissions so divergent from industry norms establish recklessness or deliberate ignorance | Magnitude does not negate a reasonable interpretation absent evidence commissions were inherently irregular or industry benchmarks were known | Size alone does not prove knowledge; it cannot substitute for evidence that MWI was objectively warned away from its interpretation |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (Sup. Ct.) (defendant entitled to offset against trebled FCA damages for payments compensating the government)
- Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (Sup. Ct.) (objective‑reasonableness standard and that informal guidance typically does not warn a regulated party away from a reasonable interpretation)
- Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (Sup. Ct.) (relator‑intervention and qui tam principles discussed)
- Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (Sup. Ct.) (vagueness and notice concerns bear on enforcement of ambiguous regulatory standards)
- K & R Ltd. P’ship v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 530 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir.) (need for authoritative guidance to warn a defendant away from a reasonable interpretation)
- United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372 (D.C. Cir.) (difficulty of proving recklessness when falsity depends on interpretive disputes)
- United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 520 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D.D.C.) (district court summary judgment ruling addressing meaning of “regular commissions")
- United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 824 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C.) (district court denying further summary judgment on falsity and knowledge)
- United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 18 (D.D.C.) (district court on damages offset and penalties)
- United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 50 F. Supp. 3d 33 (D.D.C.) (district court Rule 50(b) denial on judgment as a matter of law)
