United States Ex Rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp.
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130971
| D.D.C. | 2011Background
- MWI allegedly paid bribes to Nigerian sales agents to obtain Ex-Im Bank loan financing totaling $74.3 million.
- Purcell, a former MWI executive, filed a False Claims Act action; the United States intervened with its own FCA and common-law claims.
- MWI certified on supplier certificates that it paid no irregular commissions, while the government alleges $28 million in irregular, bribe-like commissions were paid to Indimi.
- The court previously summarized discovery and summary-judgment posture, including prior rulings on Eller and partial FCA issues.
- MWI moved to strike two witnesses (Fancher, Moorhouse) and sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under the public-disclosure bar; the government moved for summary judgment on FCA elements and damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction under FCA public-disclosure bar | Purcell maintains suit is not based on public disclosures. | Purcell's allegations were publicly disclosed, triggering the bar. | Public-disclosure bar does not apply; jurisdiction retained. |
| Admissibility of late-disclosed witnesses | Fancher and Moorhouse declarations are relevant to newly developed legal theories. | Late disclosures were prejudicial and should be struck. | Court grants government motions to strike both declarations. |
| Falsity of Indimi commission under FCA | Indimi commission was not a regular commission; falsity established. | Industry framework for what constitutes regular commission is undefined; factual jury question. | Genuine dispute of material fact; no summary judgment on falsity. |
| Materiality under FCA | Disclosures were material to Ex-Im Bank’s loan decisions. | Materiality not shown; actions may not have affected decisions. | Genuine dispute of material fact; no summary judgment on materiality. |
| Damages causation under FCA | Ex-Im Bank would not have approved loans if fraud were known; damages equal to $74.3 million. | Actual reliance and causation contested; damages uncertain. | Genuine dispute of material fact; no summary judgment on damages. |
Key Cases Cited
- U.S. ex rel. Quinn v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (qui tam public-disclosure framework and original-source concept)
- U.S. ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., 59 F.3d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (elements of FCA claim and damages framework)
- U.S. v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (FCA materiality standard and evidence considerations)
- U.S. v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 2008) (definition of materiality in FCA context)
- U.S. ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Rule 9(b) pleading standards for FCA qui tam actions)
- U.S. ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908 (4th Cir. 2003) (materiality discussed in FCA context)