United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U.S. 419

The False Claims Act (FCA) authorizes private relators to bring qui tam suits on the Government’s behalf; relators file complaints under seal and the Government has 60 days (often extended) to decide whether to intervene.
If the Government intervenes, it “shall have the primary responsibility” and the relator remains only in a subordinate role; the FCA also allows post-seal intervention upon a showing of good cause.
Jesse Polansky filed a qui tam suit alleging Executive Health Resources enabled hospitals to overbill Medicare; the Government declined to intervene in the initial seal period.
After years of discovery and mounting burdens (including privilege issues), the Government moved under 31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(2)(A) to dismiss the action over Polansky’s objection.
The district court granted dismissal; the Third Circuit affirmed, holding the Government may dismiss whenever it has intervened (including post-seal) and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) governs the standard.
The Supreme Court affirmed: the Government may seek dismissal under §3730(c)(2)(A) whenever it has intervened (pre- or post-seal), and district courts should apply Rule 41(a) (with the FCA’s notice/hearing requirement and attention to relator interests).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Government can move to dismiss under §3730(c)(2)(A) after it declined to intervene during the seal period	Polansky: dismissal power applies only if Government intervened during the seal period; a later intervention must not strip the relator of the “right to conduct the action.”	Government (and EHR): Paragraph 2 applies regardless of intervention timing; Government can dismiss even if it never intervened.	The Court: Paragraph 2 applies only once the Government has intervened, but timing doesn’t matter—Government may dismiss if it intervenes either during the seal period or later.
Standard for district court review of a §3730(c)(2)(A) dismissal motion	Polansky: a more searching standard (arbitrary-and-capricious with burden-shifting) to protect relator interests.	Government: essentially broad discretion to dismiss.	The Court: apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) (post-answer dismissals require court order under Rule 41(a)(2)); incorporate FCA’s notice/hearing requirement and give substantial deference to Government while considering relator interests.

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion)
United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (Government remains a real party in interest; nonparty status before intervention)
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (qui tam actions effect a partial assignment of the Government’s claim; relator standing)
Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147 (interpretive principle that every clause and word of a statute should have meaning)
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (statutory constructions that put provisions at war should be avoided)
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (Rule 41 analysis centers on the interests implicated by voluntary dismissal)
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (courts should not infer that Congress intended to displace the Federal Rules absent a clear statement)
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (similar principle limiting implied exceptions to the Federal Rules)