United States Ex Rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co., 816 F.3d 565

Background

NPOESS was a multi-agency satellite program; Raytheon subcontracted to build the VIIRS sensor; the program experienced well‑publicized delays, cost overruns, and management problems.
GAO reports, an Inspector General report, congressional hearings, and press coverage documented technical and management deficiencies in VIIRS and referenced poor subcontractor project management.
Steven Mateski, a former Raytheon VIIRS engineer, filed a qui tam False Claims Act suit in 2006 alleging specific, intentional fraud: false waivers, forged signoffs, use of prohibited materials (e.g., pure tin), ESD failures, substitute testing, and misrepresentations to the government leading to improper payments.
The government declined intervention; Raytheon moved to dismiss under the FCA public disclosure bar (31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (pre‑2010 version)), arguing Mateski’s claims were based on publicly disclosed allegations/transactions.
The district court dismissed, finding the public disclosures and Mateski’s complaint were the same for § 3730(e)(4)(A) purposes.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding Mateski’s allegations are not substantially similar to the prior public disclosures when viewed at the appropriate (granular) level of detail.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the FCA public disclosure bar deprives court of jurisdiction	Mateski: public reports disclosed only generalized problems; his complaint supplies specific, new, material allegations of intentional fraud	Raytheon: public GAO/IG reports and media disclosed the relevant problems; Mateski’s claims are substantially similar and thus barred	Court: Reversed dismissal — Mateski’s allegations differ in kind/degree and are not substantially similar when compared at the proper level of granularity
Whether prior public materials contained an "allegation" or "transaction" of fraud	Mateski: public materials described true problems but did not explicitly disclose fraudulent misrepresentations; thus did not present the misrepresented+true facts needed	Raytheon: public documents arguably allowed inference that Raytheon continued billing despite nonconformance, constituting a disclosed transaction	Court: It is arguable a “transaction” might be inferred, but resolution unnecessary; even assuming a transaction was disclosed, Mateski’s complaint is not based upon it because of lack of substantial similarity
Proper standard/level of generality for "substantially similar" comparison	Mateski: comparison must be at an appropriately granular level; sweeping/general descriptions should not bar suits that add defendant‑specific, novel details	Raytheon: high‑level similarity (both describe VIIRS problems) suffices to trigger the bar	Court: Adopted a granular approach (following Seventh Circuit reasoning); viewing allegations only at highest generality is unsound — specific, new, material allegations survive the bar
Whether being "partly based upon" public disclosures bars the suit	Mateski: even if some background overlaps, the core fraud allegations are new and materially different	Raytheon: suit is at least partly based on public reports, which is enough under some circuits to bar the action	Court: Even under a "partly based upon" approach, the relator must still show substantial similarity for the bar to apply; here no substantial similarity, so bar fails

Key Cases Cited

United States ex rel. Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (FCA public disclosure/original source framework)
Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280 (2010) (legislative purpose of public disclosure bar and balance between whistleblowers and parasitic suits)
Foundation Aiding The Elderly v. Horizon W., Inc., 265 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (public disclosure may disclose a transaction when material elements are present)
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401 (2011) (discussion of the broad scope of "allegations or transactions")
Alcan Elec. & Eng’g, Inc. v. United States, 197 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 1999) (example of near‑identical public disclosures triggering the bar)
Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing ordinary contract breaches from FCA fraud)
United States ex rel. Baltazar v. Warden, 635 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2011) (relator supplied defendant‑specific facts of intentional fraud not in public report)
United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 680 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (public report’s general findings do not bar relator’s distinct, specific deceit allegations)
Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2013) (complaint alleging a more sophisticated scheme survives public disclosure bar when only similar at high level)