981 F.3d 516
6th Cir.2020Background
- Relator Dr. Gurpreet Maur, a cardiologist who worked for Dr. Elie Hage‑Korban’s practice (Delta Clinics) in 2016, sued under the False Claims Act alleging unnecessary angioplasties, stenting, and cardiac tests billed in part to Medicare (examples dated Mar–Nov 2016).
- A prior qui tam (Deming, filed 2007) accused Korban of overutilization; the United States intervened and settled claims for procedures from 2004–2012. Korban entered an Integrity Agreement (Korban IA) with HHS‑OIG effective Nov 13, 2013–Nov 13, 2016, requiring an Independent Review Organization and quarterly reports; DOJ press releases and the IA were publicly posted.
- Jackson Regional separately settled with the Inspector General in July 2015 and issued public statements. The Korban IA and press releases were publicly accessible before Maur filed suit.
- Maur filed his qui tam complaint in April 2017; the United States declined to intervene. Defendants moved to dismiss under the FCA public‑disclosure bar (31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)); the district court dismissed, finding Maur’s allegations substantially the same as prior public disclosures and that Maur was not an original source.
- Maur acknowledged his complaint largely repeats the Deming allegations and added several patient examples but conceded the allegations were "not new" and copied portions of the Deming complaint verbatim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Korban Integrity Agreement and related materials were a "public disclosure" under § 3730(e)(4)(A) | Korban IA was not a public disclosure (forfeited in district court); Maur implied the IA shouldn't trigger the bar | The Korban IA and DOJ press releases were public federal reports and disclosures | Held: Yes. The Korban IA and related public statements qualified as public disclosures available before Maur's suit |
| Whether Maur's allegations are "substantially the same" as prior public disclosures | Maur argued post‑settlement/ post‑IA allegations are new and temporally distinct, so not substantially the same | Defendants argued the complaints expose the same actor, same type of fraud, and put the government on notice of the scheme | Held: Maur's allegations are substantially the same as the Deming disclosures; added details did not change the essential identity of the scheme |
| Whether Maur is an "original source" by prior voluntary disclosure before the public disclosures (§ 3730(e)(4)(B)(i)) | Maur claimed his allegations were not based on the public disclosures because they involve later conduct | Defendants noted Maur did not disclose anything to the government before the Deming/IA disclosures | Held: No. Maur did not provide information to the government prior to those public disclosures |
| Whether Maur is an "original source" by independent knowledge that "materially adds" and prior voluntary disclosure (§ 3730(e)(4)(B)(ii)) | Maur asserted his additional patient examples materially add to disclosures and alerted government to continued fraud | Defendants argued the IA provided ongoing government oversight and Maur's extra examples were not material new information | Held: No. Maur’s additional examples during the IA oversight period did not materially add to public disclosures and would not have affected government decision‑making; thus he is not an original source |
Key Cases Cited
- Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401 (2011) (describing the scope and purpose of the FCA public‑disclosure bar)
- United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2009) (warning against "parasitic" qui tam suits and applying substantial‑identity principles)
- United States ex rel. Holloway v. Heartland Hospice, Inc., 960 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 2020) (applying the post‑amendment public‑disclosure bar and finding "substantial identity" forecloses later suits)
- United States ex rel. Ibanez v. Bristol‑Myers Squibb Co., 874 F.3d 905 (6th Cir. 2017) (discussing when post‑settlement allegations may avoid the bar where fraud continued long after oversight ended)
- United States ex rel. Whipple v. Chattanooga‑Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 782 F.3d 260 (6th Cir. 2015) (treating agency postings as public disclosures)
- United States ex rel. Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 816 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining the materiality requirement for the original‑source exception)