United States Ex Rel. Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 816 F.3d 428

ABLE, an Ohio non-profit, sued U.S. Bank under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging the bank falsely certified compliance with FHA-backed mortgage loss-mitigation requirements and then sought federal insurance payments after foreclosures.
ABLE identified three representative foreclosures and extrapolated a pattern it says affected ~22,000 homes and $2.3 billion in federal insurance payments; DOJ declined to intervene.
The district court found ABLE pleaded cognizable FCA violations but dismissed the qui tam claim as precluded by the FCA’s public-disclosure bar; ABLE appealed.
The alleged factual bases: (1) U.S. Bank failed to perform required loss-mitigation efforts (e.g., face-to-face meetings), and (2) U.S. Bank falsely certified compliance on insurance claim forms.
Prior to ABLE’s suit, a 2011 consent order between U.S. Bank and federal regulators and a 2011 multi-agency foreclosure-practices review publicly disclosed widespread failures in loss mitigation and affidavit processes.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding the relevant allegations were publicly disclosed and ABLE was not an original source that materially added to the public disclosures; the court treated dismissal as on the merits (Rule 12(b)(6)), not for lack of jurisdiction (12(b)(1)).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ABLE’s FCA allegations were barred by the public-disclosure rule	The specific fraud (false FHA insurance certifications tied to federally insured mortgages) was not publicly disclosed before ABLE’s suit	Prior public disclosures (2011 consent order and foreclosure review) already revealed failures in loss mitigation and affidavit processes that put the government on notice of possible fraud	Public disclosure bar applied; allegations were publicly disclosed, so qui tam suit barred
Whether ABLE was an original source that "materially adds" to public disclosures	ABLE’s three incidents provided new, specific, materially significant information about FHA-insured-loan misconduct	The three incidents were merely additional examples that did not supply information that would change government decision-making beyond existing disclosures	ABLE was not an original source; its information did not materially add to prior disclosures
Whether the public-disclosure bar is jurisdictional	ABLE implied dismissal was jurisdictional (affecting court’s power)	The 2010 FCA amendments changed mandatory "no jurisdiction" language to a dismissal command, rendering the bar nonjurisdictional	The court held the bar is nonjurisdictional and dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than 12(b)(1)

Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401 (clarifies broad scope of "allegations or transactions" for public-disclosure bar)
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (discusses previous jurisdictional treatment of FCA public-disclosure bar)
U.S. ex rel. Gilligan v. Medtronic, Inc., 403 F.3d 386 (6th Cir.) (prior disclosure that notifies government of possibility of fraud suffices)
U.S. ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503 (6th Cir.) (public disclosure need not explicitly allege "fraud")
U.S. ex rel. Jones v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 160 F.3d 326 (6th Cir.) (public disclosures that create an inference of wrongdoing are sufficient)