United States Ass'n of Reptile Keepers, Inc. v. Zinke, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6002

The Lacey Act (18 U.S.C. § 42) bans importation of species designated "injurious" and, since a 1960 amendment, contains a "shipment clause" prohibiting shipments “between the continental United States, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any possession of the United States.”
Historically the Interior Department treated the clause as barring shipments between the listed jurisdictions (e.g., continental U.S. ↔ Hawaii) but not as forbidding shipments among the 49 continental States themselves.
The Fish and Wildlife Service later interpreted the clause to bar all interstate shipments of listed injurious species (including shipments between continental States) and promulgated rules listing several snakes (including reticulated pythons and green anacondas) as injurious.
The U.S. Association of Reptile Keepers (ARK) sued, challenging the Service’s authority to criminalize transport of listed species between continental States and sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the 2015 rule.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, holding the shipment clause does not reach shipments between the 49 continental States; the government appealed.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed, interpreting the shipment clause as prohibiting shipments between the listed jurisdictions but not as addressing shipments within the continental United States (i.e., state-to-state shipments among the 49 mainland States).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Lacey Act’s shipment clause prohibit shipments of injurious species between one continental State and another (i.e., interstate shipments among the 49 continental States)?	ARK: "between" followed by the listed jurisdictions prohibits shipments only between the listed objects (e.g., continental United States ↔ Hawaii), not within a listed object; thus the clause does not reach state-to-state shipments among the continental States.	Government: The clause bars all interstate shipments; the phrasing (including "or") and agency practice support reading "between the continental United States" to encompass shipments among the 49 States.	The court held the clause prohibits shipments between the listed jurisdictions but does not reach shipments within the continental United States; the government lacks authority under the shipment clause to criminalize shipments between continental States.

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (statutory interpretation begins with text)
Serono Laboratories, Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (standard of review for legal questions on preliminary injunctions)
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (courts may decide merits on interlocutory appeal when legal question is dispositive)
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (procedural principles for reviewing interlocutory relief)
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (legislative history may support clear text but does not override it)
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991) (subsequent reenactment does not ratify an administrative construction when text is plain)
Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102 (construction by implication requires positive repugnancy)
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (avoidance of congressional surplusage)