United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Rankin, 468 S.W.3d 609

Rankin and family sued UPS and Leal for negligence after Rankin bicycle collision with a parked UPS vehicle at 109 Ranger Creek Road, Boerne, Texas.
Leal parked partly on the road with hazard lights on, during hot, sunny, clear conditions; visibility was contested.
Rankin was severely injured and later became a partial quadriplegic; trial included negligence per se and common-law negligence theories.
Jury answered Question 1 (parking outside a residence district) affirmatively, Question 3 (negligence of both Leal and Rankin) affirmatively, and divided liability 50% Leal / 50% Rankin in Question 4.
Damages awarded: Rankin over $7 million; wife nearly $1 million; each child $450,000 for loss of parental consortium; judgment entered accordingly.
UPS appeals, challenging proximate cause, apportionment, sufficiency of negligence per se, evidentiary rulings, and attorneys’ fees/expenses.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proximate cause sufficiency	Rankin argues Leal’s parking proximately caused injuries.	UPS argues Rankin’s own conduct/other factors break causal chain; parking not substantial factor.	Evidence legally and factually sufficient for causation.
Proportionate responsibility	Rankin and Leal each contributed, equal 50% apportionment supported by trial evidence.	UPS contends Rankin’s role or visibility undermines 50/50 split; Parked vehicle was primary cause.	Sufficient evidence to support 50% Rankin / 50% Leal allocation.
Negligence per se submission	Question 1 correctly asked whether Leal parked outside a residence district; jury applied statutory terms with defined residences.	UPS contends Question 1 was a question of law and improperly delegated to jury; argues definitions and evidence were misapplied.	Submission to jury not error; question deemed one of fact applied to defined terms.
Evidence and related rulings	Rankin contends certain deposition/exhibit evidence and testimony supported negligence per se apportionment.	UPS challenged admissibility and scope of certain evidence and testimony.	No reversible abuse of discretion in evidentiary rulings; some testimony considered harmless.

Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1995) (defines foreseeability and cause-in-fact standards in proximate cause analysis)
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standard for reviewing factual sufficiency; juries as sole credibility assessors)
Romero v. KPH Consolidation, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2005) (harmful error when invalid liability theories in broad-form questions affect apportionment)
Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000) (harmful error from submitting invalid theories in broad-form questions)
Harris County v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2002) (damages instruction; evidentiary considerations in broad-form questions)
El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012) (lodestar method for attorney’s fees; multiplier discretion)