842 F.3d 407
6th Cir.2016Background
- Hardin County, Kentucky adopted Ordinance 300 (Jan. 2015) prohibiting employers from requiring union membership or payments as a condition of employment and declaring such agreements void (a local “right-to-work” law).
- Several unions sued, arguing the ordinance is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); district court granted summary judgment to the unions, invalidating the county ordinance.
- The district court held § 14(b) of the NLRA (which excepts "State or Territorial" laws banning union-security agreements from preemption) does not encompass laws of state political subdivisions, and that Garmon field preemption bars local regulation of activity arguably protected or prohibited by §§ 7–8 of the NLRA.
- Hardin County appealed, arguing: (1) § 14(b)’s reference to "State" includes political subdivisions (so the county law is excepted from preemption), and (2) Congress did not clearly occupy the field of union-security regulation to preempt local right-to-work measures.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part: it held § 14(b) includes political subdivisions (so the county’s ban on union-security agreements is not preempted), but upheld preemption of the ordinance’s prohibitions on hiring-hall agreements and dues-checkoff provisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a county right-to-work ordinance is "State law" under NLRA § 14(b) | § 14(b) refers only to laws enacted by a State or Territory, not local ordinances | "State" includes political subdivisions; counties act under delegated state authority and thus fall within § 14(b) | Held for defendant (county): § 14(b)’s use of "State" includes political subdivisions, so the county’s ban on union-security agreements is excepted from NLRA preemption and valid |
| Whether Garmon/field preemption bars local regulation of union-security agreements | NLRA preempts state/local regulation of activities arguably protected or prohibited by §§ 7–8; local ordinance conflicts with federal scheme | § 14(b) is an explicit exception to preemption; Congress did not clearly manifest intent to exclude local laws from § 14(b) | Held for defendant (county) as to § 14(b) issue: explicit § 14(b) exception defeats Garmon field preemption for the county’s right-to-work provision |
| Whether prohibitions on hiring-hall agreements are saved by § 14(b) | County: practical effect of banning hiring halls is to preserve right-to-work and should be covered | Unions: hiring-hall regulation overlaps with NLRA/LMRA protections and is not literally within § 14(b) | Held for plaintiffs (unions): hiring-hall prohibition not covered by § 14(b) and is preempted |
| Whether dues-checkoff prohibition is preempted | County: dues-checkoff ban effectuates right-to-work policy and should stand | Unions: dues-checkoff is subject to federal regulation (LMRA) and dual regulation would conflict; § 14(b) does not literally cover it | Held for plaintiffs (unions): dues-checkoff prohibition is preempted and unenforceable |
Key Cases Cited
- San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (Garmon preemption: states must defer to NLRB where activity is arguably protected or prohibited by NLRA)
- Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (§ 14(b) allows states to outlaw union-security agreements despite Garmon concerns)
- Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (statutory reference to "State" ordinarily preserves a State’s discretion to delegate authority to local subdivisions)
- City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, 536 U.S. 424 (absent clear congressional statement, "State" usually includes political subdivisions for purposes of preemption exceptions)
- NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (federal aim of uniform labor law and limits on state interference)
- State of Tennessee v. FCC, 832 F.3d 597 (6th Cir.) (applies clear-statement rule to preserve state allocations of power vis-à-vis local subdivisions)
- SeaPAK v. Indus., Tech. & Prof. Employees, 300 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Ga.) (state regulation of dues-checkoff held preempted; affirmed)