Union Pacific Railroad v. Utah Department of Transportation, 310 P.3d 1204

Background

UDOT initially classified a railroad crossing near 400 North/Vineyard Road as private, later reversed to public after new information from landowner Anderson Geneva and the Town of Vineyard.
Union Pacific objected, petitioned the Public Service Commission (PSC) to overturn UDOT’s public classification; Anderson Geneva intervened to defend the public classification and challenge a temporary closure order.
Parties stipulated the road and crossing were public by 1942; Utah County’s 1942 resolution vacated land for Geneva Steel but did not formally vacate the crossing according to witness testimony.
No formal abandonment or vacatur proceedings occurred after 1942; the crossing later may have shifted or been reconfigured (possibly in the 1970s), and a locked gate limited public use from one approach.
The PSC found substantial evidence the crossing remained public: no formal abandonment, UDOT guidelines permit classification despite one blocked approach, and multiple public records had listed the crossing as public for decades.
Union Pacific appealed to this Court arguing either formal abandonment or that the current crossing is a different road (never dedicated public), but failed to present conclusive evidence on either point.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Union Pacific)	Defendant's Argument (UDOT / Anderson Geneva / PSC)	Held
Was the crossing public or privately controlled such that UDOT lacked jurisdiction?	The crossing became private after the road was relocated/off the public right‑of‑way in the 1970s.	The crossing remained public because it was public in 1942 and was never formally abandoned or vacated.	Held public: PSC/UDOT classification upheld; UDOT has authority to determine jurisdiction and its factual finding was supported by substantial evidence.
Did the absence of present public use (locked gate, limited approach) defeat public status?	Lack of use and a locked gate show the crossing is functionally private.	Physical impediments or lack of maintenance do not extinguish public status absent formal vacatur.	Held: Absent formal abandonment, lack of use/maintenance is irrelevant to public status.
Could relocation or reconfiguration of the road (1970s) produce a new private crossing?	The road’s movement created a new crossing that was never dedicated public, so UDOT lacks jurisdiction over it.	Even if moved or reconfigured, a public right of way may be shifted or improved so long as the practical identity/use is preserved or changes were necessary for safety.	Held: Union Pacific failed to prove the crossing moved sufficiently or that changes extinguished the original public right; PSC reasonably found evidence insufficient to deem it a new private crossing.
Standard of review: de novo or deferential?	Argues legal/jurisdictional question warrants less deference.	Agency mixed‑question decisions are fact‑like and warrant deference.	Held: Review is deferential under mixed‑question framework (In re Adoption of Baby B. factors); PSC’s fact‑based determination is entitled to deference.

Key Cases Cited

Basin Flying Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 531 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1975) (agencies derive implied powers necessary to discharge statutory duties)
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Bd. of Oil, Gas, & Mining, 289 P.3d 558 (Utah 2012) (substantial‑evidence standard for agency factual findings)
State v. Harvey Real Estate, 57 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2002) (public roads remain until formally abandoned; statute allows no informal abandonment)
Culbertson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 44 P.3d 642 (Utah 2001) (public highway remains until proper authority orders abandonment)
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646 (Utah 1929) (public acquires right only in a certain way; slight deviations preserving practical identity do not defeat the right)
Hubble v. Cache Cnty. Drainage Dist. No. 3, 259 P.2d 893 (Utah 1953) (right‑of‑way may be changed so long as usefulness and burdens are not adversely affected)
Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2008) (scope of public right‑of‑way is reasonable and necessary for safe travel)
Lyman Grazing Ass'n v. Smith, 473 P.2d 905 (Utah 1970) (location of an easement may be changed by agreement of servient and dominant owners)
Wykoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756 (Utah 1982) (deed‑created rights‑of‑way are limited to uses and extent fixed by the instrument)